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Preface
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feedback.
Special thanks go to my colleagues in the Development and Economic Research Group
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A thought also goes to my co-author Pablo Selaya - it has been a constructive and
pleasant experience to work with you. I have also appreciated the company of my
roomies Pablo Selaya and Christo¤er Sonne-Schmidt with whom I have had many
useful discussions about econometric issues, STATA programming and life in general.
Finally, and most importantly, I am indebted to my husband, Morten Rytter Sunesen,
for his unconditional and invaluable encouragement throughout the project. Being with
you and our three wonderful daughters always made me stay on track and helped me
stand by my values and priorities.
I hope you enjoy the reading.
Eva Rytter Sunesen
Copenhagen, February 2009
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Summary
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has become an increasingly important source of capital
in developing countries during the last decade with FDI inows more than tripling since
the mid 1990s. Due to its potential to transfer knowledge and technology, create jobs,
boost overall productivity, and enhance competitiveness and entrepreneurship, attracting
FDI to developing countries is essential to contribute to economic growth, development
and poverty reduction. For these reasons, it is important for policy makers in these
countries to understand the driving forces of FDI.
So far, researchers have been unable to reach a consensus on a theoretical framework
to guide empirical work on FDI, which has resulted in an enormous volume of empir-
ical papers that vary in their selection of explanatory variables, in their econometric
methodology and in their theoretical foundation. The four papers contained in this thesis
contribute to the literature on FDI in several ways.
The rst paper provides a systematic review of empirical studies in order to detect
regularities in the regional distribution of FDI among developing countries. The second
paper attempts to solve the ambiguity in the choice of political, economic and commercial
risk variables by deriving a deep-rooted and structural idiosyncratic risk measure. The
third paper argues that global and regional business cycle e¤ects should be accounted for
in the empirical FDI specication, and it proposes to use a portfolio approach to explain
the distribution of FDI across developing countries. Finally, the fourth paper emphasises
the importance of complementary factors in a countrys attractiveness for foreign investors
and concludes that foreign aid should be directed towards such factors in order to have a
dynamic e¤ect on FDI.
The papers included in this thesis build on a broad selection of micro-econometric
tools (cross-section and panel data estimation techniques). Each chapter is self-contained
but Chapter 3 applies the risk measure derived in Chapter 2. Also, the review in Chapter
1 provides a base of knowledge that benets the remaining chapters. A summary of each
chapter is given below.
Chapter 1 Examining the Regional Aspect of Foreign Direct Investment to Developing
Countries sets out to detect regularities in the regional distribution of FDI by reviewing
the part of the literature that in some way or the other tackles the regional aspect of
FDI. Furthermore, the results from a general-to-specic analysis suggest that regional
di¤erences in FDI inows to African, Asian and Latin American countries can be explained
by structural characteristics rather than xed regional e¤ects. The implication is that
countries that are lagging behind other developing countries in attracting foreign capital
have the opportunity to implement policies aimed at improving the investment climate
for foreign investors and thereby increase FDI inows. This also means that there is no
African bias.
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Furthermore, we nd that growth and ination are robust and signicant across regions
although the size of their impact varies, while other variables clearly turn out to be
region-specic. While African and Asian countries are largely heterogeneous both with
respect to the set of explanatory variables and their impact on FDI, Asian and Latin
American countries are more homogeneous and can more readily be pooled as long as
proper interaction terms are specied.
Chapter 2 Measuring Idiosyncratic Risk: Implications for Capital Flows o¤ers a re-
ned risk measure that is based on the variance of GDP growth. Since the variance
of GDP growth can only be interpreted as idiosyncratic country risk when events are
unpredictable, this paper o¤ers a renement that serves to take out the structural and
systematic components and ends up with an improved proxy for idiosyncratic risk. The
chapter proceeds in two steps. First, we derive a conditional risk measure by drawing
on the augmented Solow growth model to account for structural characteristics of the
host country that move only slowly and therefore can be partly predicted by the investor.
Second, since countries are interdependent there will be some systematic components in
the local return to investment that depend on common factors, and we use a principal
components analysis to adjust for the systematic risk caused by synchronisations in global
and regional business cycles.
The decomposition of risk into its systematic and idiosyncratic components reveals
that not only are African countries on average characterised by a larger conditional risk
than Asian and Latin American countries, but the idiosyncratic risk factor also repre-
sents a larger share than in other developing countries. As a nal exercise we use a
general-to-specic methodology and nd that both economic and political risk variables
are important determinants of idiosyncratic risk whereas the commercial aspects of risk
are poorly dened. Rather than including various risk measures on an ad hoc basis,
our results indicate that the ability of a country to service its debt, the current account
balance, government consumption, democratic accountability and external conicts are
important determinants of risk.
Chapter 3 A Mean-Variance Explanation of FDI Flows to Developing Countries is
based on the observation that an important feature of the world economy is the close global
and regional integration due to strong trade and investment relations among countries.
The high degree of integration between countries is likely to give rise to business cycle
synchronisation in which case shocks spill over from one country to another thus giving
rise to systematic movements in returns that can be partly predicted by an investor. This
chapter utilises a simple mean-variance optimisation framework where global and regional
factors capture the interdependence between countries. The model implies that FDI is
driven by the risk-adjusted rate of return as well as global and regional spillovers.
We test the implications of the theoretical model in a cross-section of 60 developing
countries. We nd that the strong relationship between FDI inows and the risk adjusted
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rate of return can only be observed when a precise measure of idiosyncratic risk is applied;
that is once we control for systematic movements due to both global and regional business
cycle synchronisation. We also nd that there is a relatively large and positive net e¤ect
from global integration. On the regional level, there is a positive net e¤ect of being located
in Asia and (to a lesser extent) in Africa.
Chapter 4 Does Aid Increase Foreign Direct Investment? analyses the notion that
O¢ cial Development Assistance (ODA) and FDI are complementary sources of capital, i.e.
that ODA has a "catalysing" e¤ect on FDI. We set up an open-economy Solow model with
perfect capital mobility that distinguishes between aid directed towards complementary
factors of production and aid invested in physical capital. The distinction serves to
illustrate, on the one hand, that aid invested in complementary factors increases MPK
in the recipient country, which tends to draw in additional foreign resources, and thus
helps to sustain a higher level of capital over time. On the other hand, the model also
shows that increased foreign aid invested in physical capital competes with other types of
capital, and thus replaces investments that private actors would have undertaken anyway.
In this case, capital mobility and rate-of-return equalisation across countries mean that
aid inows will only give rise to a ight of other types of capital.
The chapter takes the implications of the theoretical model to the data utilising a panel
of 84 countries over the period 1970-2001. The results strongly support the hypotheses
that aid invested in complementary inputs draws in foreign capital while aid invested in
physical capital crowds out FDI. The combined e¤ect of these two types of aid is small
but on average positive, which implies that more aid should be directed towards inputs
complementary to physical capital in order to optimise the return on aid.
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Chapter 1
Understanding the Regional Aspect of FDI
6
Examining the Regional Aspect of Foreign Direct
Investment to Developing Countries
Eva Rytter Suneseny
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
Abstract
This paper applies a general-to-specic analysis to detect regularities in the
driving forces of foreign direct investment (FDI) that can explain why some regions
are more attractive to foreign investors than others. The results suggest that re-
gional di¤erences in FDI inows to African, Asian and Latin American countries
can be fully explained by structural characteristics rather than xed regional e¤ects.
The implication of this nding is that countries that are lagging behind other de-
veloping countries in attracting foreign capital have the opportunity to implement
policies aimed at improving the investment climate for foreign investors. This also
means that there is no African bias. Among a large number of return and risk
variables applied in the empirical literature, growth and ination turn out to be
the only robust and signicant FDI determinants across regions although the size
of their impact varies.
Keywords: Foreign direct investment, Africa, Asia, Latin America, general-to-
specic
JEL classications: F21, O57
1 Introduction
During the last two decades, most developing countries have reformed their institutions,
improved their infrastructure and liberalised their regulatory framework in order to attract
foreign direct investments (FDI). However, Table 1 shows that FDI inows in absolute
terms remain unevenly distributed among developing countries and regions. Asia proved
to be the biggest destination of FDI accounting for more than half of total FDI going to
developing countries, followed by Latin America that absorbed close to one third. In Asia,
I am grateful for the valulable comments by Carl-Johan Dalgaard and Heino Bohn Nielsen.
yDepartment of Economics, University of Copenhagen. Studiestræde 6, 1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark.
E-mail address: eva.rytter.sunesen@econ.ku.dk.
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the main part of FDI ows to East Asia, where China is the most favoured FDI destination
receiving more than 20 per cent of FDI going to developing countries.1 Africa, on the other
hand, received a small and declining share of FDI. If we adjust for the economic size of the
country and analyse FDI as a share of GDP, Figure 1 shows a more even distribution of
FDI although regional di¤erences persist. While East Asia took o¤ in the 1990s, recently
Africa has managed to attract further FDI inows. Relative to its economic size, FDI
to Africa is now at comparable levels with East Asia and Latin America. South Asia
continues to be lagging behind. This paper sets out to analyse regional di¤erences in FDI
between African, Asian and Latin American countries.2
First, it reviews the subset of FDI studies that have tackled the regional aspect of the
FDI decision by including regional dummies, by including interactions between regional
dummies and selected explanatory variables or by analysing FDI ows on a regional
basis. While the broad FDI literature has been reviewed quite frequently, this paper is
the rst to focus on the regional aspect of FDI and to collect regional studies in a coherent
framework. This approach provides information about regularities in the driving forces of
FDI across regions and points out possible region-specic variables. The ndings suggest
that regional dummies rarely turn out signicant in elaborate models of FDI, that the
signicance of interactions between regional dummies and FDI determinants suggests that
there is a large degree of heterogeneity between regions and, nally, that there seems to
be a pool of common FDI determinants but that region-specic characteristics should also
be taken into account.
Since the empirical studies reviewed in this paper vary widely in their sample selection,
estimation method, time horizon and set of explanatory variables the results are not
directly comparable, and it is therefore di¢ cult to draw conclusions about why we observe
di¤erences in the regional distribution of FDI. Since there is no consensus of a theoretical
framework for FDI, we let the data speak.
In the second part of the paper we apply a general-to specic analysis of the many FDI
determinants that have been applied in the existing literature. We do so both in a broad
cross-section of developing countries, where we also include regional dummy variables, and
on a region-by-region basis. Overall, the results suggest that regional di¤erences are not
due to xed regional e¤ects. We nd that growth and ination are robust and signicant
across regions although the size of their impact varies, while other variables clearly turn
out to be region-specic. While African and Asian countries are largely heterogeneous
both with respect to the set of explanatory variables and their impact on FDI, Asian and
1In light of Chinas outstanding role, some studies exclude China from the sample (see UNCTAD
(1994) and World Bank (1996) for further discussion). As an alternative, Jakobsen and Soysa (2006)
include a China dummy that turn out positive and highly signicant.
2A large number of studies analyse the ow of FDI to Eastern European countries. These studies
are typically based on a gravity model specication of bilateral FDI ows and will not be reviewed here.
Also, studies of FDI to the Middle East and North African countries are too scarce to draw meaningful
comparisons.
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Latin American countries are more homogeneous and can more readily be pooled as long
as proper interaction terms are specied.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a short introduction to the ways regional
di¤erences have been modelled econometrically in the empirical FDI literature. Section
3 reviews the subset of empirical FDI studies that have set out to explain regional di¤er-
ences in FDI by including regional dummies, by including interactions between regional
dummies and selected explanatory variables to control for heterogeneity, or undertaking
regional studies that assume complete heterogeneity between regions and furthermore al-
low for the inclusion of region-specic variables. Section 4 applies a general-to-specic
analysis of 36 potential FDI determinants in 100 developing countries on an overall as
well as on a regional basis. Finally, Section 5 summarises and concludes.
2 Modelling the Regional Aspect of FDI
The regional aspect of FDI has been approached in many di¤erent ways in the empirical
FDI literature. At one extreme, it has been argued that foreign investors think of countries
as being completely independent and homogeneous so that FDI ows can be explained by
the same set of explanatory variables and homogeneous parameters independent of the
countries included in the sample:
FDIit = + x
0
it + uit; (1)
where FDIit is the inow of FDI to country i (i = 1; :::; N) as a share of GDP, N is the
number of developing countries in the sample at time t (t = 1; :::; T ), xit is a vector of
FDI determinants and uit is an error term. In this case, regional di¤erences in the inow
of foreign capital can be fully explained by di¤erent country characteristics captured by
xit. The broad FDI literature based on (1) has been reviewed quite frequently but so
far no consensus about the theoretical model or the econometric specication of the FDI
relation has been reached (see Bloningen (2005) for a recent survey).
The inability of (1) to explain the distribution of FDI across countries and regions
has lead some researchers to look for new explanatory variables to be included in xit
(most notable is the recent inclusion of various risk variables), while others have tested
alternative ways to model FDI. This paper focuses on the latter approach and reviews
empirical FDI studies that allow for regional heterogeneity.
The rst group of studies bases the analysis on a panel of countries belonging to
di¤erent regions. In general, this group of studies base their empirical FDI specication
on a variant of:
FDIijt = j + x
0
ijtj + uijt; (2)
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where j is a regional dummy variable that takes on the value one for countries belong-
ing to region j and zero otherwise (j = 1; :::; J where J is the number of regions) and
which adjusts for time invariant regional e¤ects. In this case, xijt is a vector of explana-
tory variables that possibly includes interactions between regional dummies and selected
explanatory variables.
The panel studies with regional dummies (reviewed in Section 3.1) explain regional
di¤erences in FDI inows by time-invariant regional e¤ects. If one believes that FDI ows
are ultimately driven by arbitrage that leads to the equalisation of marginal productivity
of production factors, see Selaya and Sunesen (2008), then this approach argues that the
uneven distribution of FDI is due to some regional e¤ect that allows the productivity of
production factors in one region to di¤er systematically from other regions. We could
think of this as "historic agglomeration e¤ects" that have given the region a reputation
or as permanent di¤erences in production factors. If such time-invariant regional e¤ects
turn out to be important, the implication is that a country that is lagging behind today
will stay behind irrespective of its ability to implement policies aimed at strengthening
the institutions that are positively associated with FDI (included in xijt).
The panel studies with heterogeneous e¤ects (reviewed in Section 3.2) use interactions
between regional dummies and selected explanatory variables to allow for heterogene-
ity in the response to FDI determinants. One reason for such structural di¤erences is
that investors are attracted to di¤erent countries according to their motive for investing
abroad.3 If the composition of FDI in this way varies systematically across regions, it
is likely that the ow of FDI to these regions will respond di¤erently to traditional FDI
determinants. Empirically, this means that the vector of explanatory variables should
include interactions between the regional dummy variable and the explanatory variables
thereby allowing parameter estimates to vary across regions.
The second group of studies (reviewed in Section 3.3) bases the analysis on a panel of
countries that belong to the same region and estimates (1) for the region under review.
This estimation method therefore allows for full heterogeneity in both i and i between
regions. One reason for using this approach is that some studies aim at answering ques-
tions, which require the use of region-specic variables that might not be relevant or might
not even exist for other regions. Examining the impact of transition on FDI inows to
Eastern European countries could be one example.
In the next section we review the large number of empirical studies that have modelled
the regional aspect of FDI explicitly. We do so in order to detect empirical regularities
in the driving forces of FDI that can inform us about the degree of heterogeneity across
regions. Ultimately, this should lead to a greater understanding of what causes regional
di¤erences in the distribution of FDI.
3The literature typically distinguishes between market-seeking, resource-seeking, e¢ ciency-seeking and
asset-seeking FDI.
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3 Review of Empirical FDI Studies
This section provides a comprehensive and structured review of empirical studies of FDI
to African, Asian and Latin American countries that have taken the regional distribution
of FDI into account by including regional dummy variables, by incorporating interactions
between regional dummy variables and potential FDI determinants or by analysing FDI
on a regional basis. These papers are typically based on panel data estimation methods
where the dependent variable is FDI as a share of GDP but where the number of countries,
the time dimension and the selection of explanatory variables di¤er widely.
3.1 Panel Studies with Regional Dummies
Table 2 summarises the ndings of 10 studies that are based on (2) in that they include
regional dummy variables. In general, the regional dummy variables should be interpreted
relative to other developing countries. A signicant African dummy thus suggests that
Africa is di¤erent from other developing countries. As one exception, the regional dummies
in Addison and Heshmati should be interpreted relative to developed countries. Overall,
we nd that only 10 out of the 17 dummy variables included in the 10 studies under review
report dummy variables that are signicant and robust to the inclusion of an extended
set of explanatory variables.
More than half of the studies included in this review have analysed if there is a par-
ticular e¤ect of being located in Africa. Jaspersen et al. (2000) and Asiedu (2002) nd
that African countries receive 2% and 1.3% points, respectively, less FDI than a compa-
rable country outside the region. The African dummy in Addison and Heshmati (2003),
Noorbakhsh and Youssef (2001), Ancharaz (2002) andWilhelms andWitter (1998), on the
other hand, turned out insignicant once economic, political and structural characteristics
were taken into account.
The negative South Asian regional dummy found in Addison and Heshmati (2003)
remains after controlling for traditional FDI determinants as well as the democratic sit-
uation in these countries. However, the signicant South Asian e¤ect in Gani (2007)
disappears once governance indicators (rule of law, control of corruption and regulatory
quality) are adjusted for. While a number of studies have found a positive and signicant
East Asian dummy only in the case of Addison and Heshmati (2003) did it turn out to
be robust to an extended set of explanatory variables. The Latin American dummy
in Noorbakhsh and Youssef (2001), Edwards (1990) and Hein (1992) was not robust to
the inclusion of other control variables, while the results in Addison and Heshmati (2003)
suggest that Latin American countries receive 1.2% points more FDI than comparable
countries.
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3.2 Panel Studies with Heterogeneous E¤ects
The six papers reviewed in this section are based on the premise that the relative im-
pact of FDI determinants should be allowed to vary across regions, and the specication
therefore includes interactions between FDI determinants and the regional dummy vari-
ables like in (2).4 The results suggest that agglomeration e¤ects, growth and openness
are equally important in all regions, whereas the return on investment, infrastructure,
political instability and scal incentives, among others, have a heterogeneous impact on
FDI across regions. We also nd that region-specic factors should be taken into account.
A number of studies analyse if countries in one region are di¤erent from other devel-
oping countries. Asiedu (2002) and Kolstad and Villanger (2008) nd that openness has
an equal impact on FDI irrespective of regional location. Asiedu (2002) also nds that
the provision of infrastructure and the return on investment have a larger impact on FDI
to African than non-African countries. The latter result is conrmed by Razamahefa
and Hamori (2005). Kolstad and Villanger (2008) nd that FDI to Latin America is
particularly sensitive to political instability, while the absence of regulation appears to
have been a particularly benecial factor.
Another set of studies compare determinants of FDI in several regions. Asiedu and
Lien (2004) nd that the impact of capital controls on FDI varies by region: capital
controls have no e¤ect on FDI to African countries but a¤ect FDI to East Asia and
Latin America adversely. Chen (1998) nds that agglomeration, growth and government
expenditures are equally important in Latin America and South East Asia, whereas scal
incentives and growth of export have a heterogeneous impact on FDI in the two regions.
In his comparison of Asia and Latin America, Nasser (2007) nds a great degree of
heterogeneity between the two regions. While agglomeration e¤ects are equally important
in the two regions, infrastructure (telephone lines) and political instability (revolutions
and assassinations) have signicant but di¤erent e¤ects in the two regions. A large number
of factors (GDP, ination, current account, schooling and political rights) only turn out
signicant in one of the regions.
3.3 Regional Studies
Table 3 and Table 4 review 21 regional studies of FDI that base their FDI specication
on (1) for the group of either African, Asian or Latin American countries.5 To ease inter-
pretation and comparison, the FDI determinants have been divided into return (market
4Chen (1998) also uses dummy variables to compare FDI in Latin American and South East Asian
countries. However, this paper is excluded since the dependent variable is FDI in per capita terms which
invalidates comparisons with the other papers in the review.
5Kandiero and Chitiga (2003), Quazi (2007b), Chen (1998), Trevino et al. (2002a, 2002b), Vogiatzou-
glou (2007) and Trevino and Mixon (2004) are excluded from the review since they use absolute FDI or
FDI in per capita terms as their dependent variable.
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potential, factor market characteristics, domestic market access, international openness
and geography) and (economic, political and commercial) risk. The overall picture arising
from these studies is very much in line with the ndings in Section 3.2. While growth,
agglomeration and ination are important in all regions, the impact of other FDI determi-
nants turns out to vary with regional location. Natural resource availability, infrastructure
and nancial stability are important in Africa; labour costs and scal incentives in Asia;
and scal balance, exchange rate stability, nancial stability and political instability in
Latin America.
Of the return variables listed in Table 3, the market potential proxies are the most
frequently used. The preferred variables are GDP, population size, GDP per capita and
GDP growth, which most often have a signicant and positive e¤ect on FDI.6 The results
also show strong agglomeration e¤ects. The regions di¤er widely in their dependence on
various factors of production. While labour costs and labour availability are relatively
important in Asia, the relatively poor quality of the labour force has been an important
deterrent factor for FDI to African and Latin American countries. Also, natural resource
availability has been a driving force in Africa. Infrastructure turns out to be important
in most regions but most often so in Africa where landlocked and geographically isolated
countries face big problems in attracting foreign capital. Advancements in structural
reforms and privatisation have been important for the relative attractiveness of countries
in Latin America. Finally, trade openness (the most frequently used being total trade)
appears to be important in all regions except Asia.
From Table 4 it is clear that the risk of investing abroad has only received attention
recently probably due to the inability of traditional return determinants to explain the
regional distribution of FDI. The economic risk variables are the most frequently included
risk measures although their impact varies widely across regions. While high ination
has been a deterrent factor in most regions, nancial and political instability seems to
have scared away investors in African and Latin American countries. Asian countries,
on the other hand, appear to have beneted from a stable or even xed exchange rate
regime. Interestingly, commercial risk is rarely accounted for in Asian and Latin American
countries. An accommodating investment climate and business environment (in particular
rule of law) as well as nancial stability, on the other hand, have had a signicant impact
on FDI in African countries.
6A few exceptions include Campos and Kinoshita (2008), Botric and Skuic (2006), Ancharaz (2002)
and Nasser (2007) where GDP, population size or GDP per capita turn out to have a negative impact on
FDI. However, these papers also include growth as an explanatory variable in which case an explanation
might be that growth turns out to be the most important proxy for market potential whereas additional
market size proxies capture something else (for example, the level of development).
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4 A General-to-Specic Analysis of FDI Flows
One of the main drawbacks in the FDI literature has been the lack of a coherent and
generally accepted theoretical framework to think about FDI and to form the basis for
empirical analysis. The theoretical vacuum has resulted in an ad hoc selection of FDI
determinants, which complicates direct comparisons across studies. To take an example,
all empirical papers have included some measure of market potential where GDP, GDP
per capita, population or GDP growth are the most commonly used proxies, and valid
theoretical arguments can be put forward for each of them. Which one should we pick?
To what extent is it appropriate to pick the same proxy irrespective of regional belonging?
And when can we expect one variable to have the same impact on FDI irrespective of
regional belonging?
Since potential explanatory variables are highly correlated, it is a challenge to select
several or all of them while avoiding multicollinearity in the model. We therefore use
a general-to-specic model selection approach, which enables us to "test down" among
the large set of explanatory variables. We use the PcGets software, which automatically
selects an undominated, congruent model where statistically insignicant variables are
eliminated and where diagnostic tests check the validity of reductions to ensure a con-
gruent nal selection. Equation mis-specication tests include residual autocorrelation,
ARCH, heteroscedasticity, functional formmis-specication, and non-normality. The path
is terminated when all the variables that remain are signicant, or a diagnostic test fails.
In some cases insignicant variables are therefore retained. We refer to Hendry (1995,
Chapter 9) for further details on this data-based model selection methodology.
Based on the empirical papers reviewed in Tables 3 and 4, we have collected data on
19 return proxies and 14 risk measures to enter the general-to-specic analysis along with
regional dummy variables for Africa, Asia and Latin America. Data is calculated as an
average over the time period 1980-2004 for a cross-section of 100 developing countries
(43 belonging to Africa, 35 located in Asia and 22 Latin American countries).7 A list of
countries can be found in Appendix. Details on the data are given in Table 5.
4.1 Empirical Findings
Table 6 reports the main results. One of the most important ndings is that none of
the regional variables turn out signicant, which suggests that regional di¤erences in FDI
inows can be fully explained by structural characteristics. This means that there is no
African bias (see Asiedu, 2002, among others). Also, we see that growth and ination are
the only two variables that turn out signicant in all specications although their marginal
7Using averages over 25 years and thus eliminating the time dimension, the cross-sectional approach
allows us to look for deep structural determinants of FDI. The disadvantage is that in some circumstances
our results will not be directly comparable to the panel studies reviewed in the previous section. For
example, it will not be possible to test for agglomeration e¤ects by including a lagged dependent variable.
14
e¤ects vary across regions. While ination has been a deterrent factor to FDI inows to
Latin American countries, ination has had a smaller marginal e¤ect in Asian and African
countries. Also, high economic growth rates have been relatively more important for Asian
countries than African and Latin American countries.
A number of observations from Section 3 are conrmed by the general-to-specic analy-
sis. International openness (trade) is important in all regions except Asia; the stability of
the exchange rate regime is important for Asian and Latin American countries; nancial
and political stability (external debt, current account balance, corruption and rule of law)
are important in Latin American countries; while low wages have been a comparative
advantage in Asian countries. The results also indicate that the focus on economic risk in
studies of FDI into Asia is misleading since political and commercial risk (political rights
as well as voice and accountability) are equally important for this region.
International openness has typically been proxied by total trade as a share of GDP,
the import share or the export share. Since trade is a linear combination of imports and
exports it is not possible to include all three of them at the same time. Table 7 reports the
results when we use the import and export shares instead of total trade as our openness
proxy. The results from Table 6 are conrmed and we see that the positive e¤ect of trade
was driven by import, which was also the case in Janicki and Wunnava (2004) and Ferris
et al. (1997).
Also, we nd that some variables are region-specic: GDP per capita, land area, roads,
international reserves and government expenditure for Africa; wage earnings, political
rights and the Kaufmann voice and accountability index for Asia; and telephone, external
debt, corruption and ores export for Latin America. The remaining six variables lie
somewhere in between where four variables turn out signicant in both Asia and Latin
America (urban population, current account, change in the exchange rate, variance of
the exchange rate) and two enter both the specication in Africa and Latin America
(trade openness and rule of law). This suggests that Africa and Asia do not seem to be
well described by the same set of variables and one should exercise caution when pooling
the two regions. Latin American and Asian countries can more readily be pooled but
interaction terms should still be incorporated to adjust for heterogeneity in the impact of
common explanatory variables.
5 Summary and Conclusion
This paper provides a comprehensive and structured review of the part of the empirical
literature that has analysed the regional di¤erences in FDI inows. A number of observa-
tions are worth highlighting. First, regional dummy variables rarely turn out to be robust
once structural characteristics of the host country are properly accounted for. Second,
the large number of signicant interaction terms between regional dummies and selected
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explanatory variables suggests that regions are highly heterogeneous and that investors
perceive regions di¤erently. And, third, regional studies suggest that there is a pool of
common FDI determinants whose impact varies across regions but also that region-specic
characteristics should be taken into account.
Since the empirical studies reviewed in this paper vary widely in their sample selec-
tion, estimation method, time horizon and set of explanatory variables the results are
not directly comparable. We therefore let the data speak and apply a general-to specic
analysis of the many determinants that have been applied in the existing FDI literature.
The results suggest that regional di¤erences are not due to xed regional e¤ects. We nd
that growth and ination are robust and signicant across regions although the size of
their impact varies. The impact from ination seems stronger in Latin America than in
Asian and African countries. Also, economic growth has had a larger marginal e¤ect in
Asian countries than in African and Latin American countries. While African and Asian
countries turn out to be largely heterogeneous both with respect to the set of explanatory
variables and their impact on FDI, Asian and Latin American countries can more readily
be pooled as long as proper interaction terms are specied. Finally, some variables appear
to be region-specic: GDP per capita, land area, roads, international reserves and govern-
ment expenditure for Africa; wage earnings, political rights and the Kaufmann voice and
accountability index for Asia; and telephone, external debt, corruption and ores export
for Latin America.
The ndings in this paper suggest that foreign investors respond quite di¤erently to
common determinants of FDI across regions and also that region-specic variables are
important to take into account when analysing FDI in a broad sample of developing
countries. However, this paper does not o¤er an explanation as to why this is so. One
interesting topic for future work could, for example, be to analyse FDI on a more disag-
gregated level to see if the observed regional heterogeneity can be explained by di¤erences
in the sectoral distribution of FDI.
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Appendix
Africa: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Chad, Congo, Cote dIvoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-
Bissau, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco,
Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan,
Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Latin America and Caribbean: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Hon-
duras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and
Venezuela.
Asia: Albania, Armenia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Fiji, Georgia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea,
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey,
Ukraine and Vanuatu.
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Figure 1. The Development of FDI as a Share of GDP, 1970-2006
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Table 1: Regional Distribution of FDI
1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2006
Developing economies (millions) 5922 20580 118185 255648
Africa 15.9 6.4 3.9 4.7
Nigeria 5.4 2.1 1.3 1.0
South Africa 1.6 0.1 0.7 0.9
Latin America 47.6 31.8 35.6 29.6
Argentina 2.2 2.8 5.8 1.7
Brazil 21.4 8.4 8.4 7.5
Mexico 7.6 11.6 7.2 7.9
Asia 29.3 43.3 56.2 53.8
East Asia 7.5 22.4 35.6 38.2
China 0.0 7.9 24.6 22.1
Hong Kong 4.5 10.4 7.6 12.3
South Korea 1.8 1.6 2.1 2.3
South Asia 1.1 1.2 2.0 3.5
South-East Asia 20.8 19.7 18.6 12.0
Indonesia 7.4 1.6 1.8 0.4
Singapore 5.1 9.3 7.2 6.1
Thailand 1.3 2.5 2.7 2.3
Note: Shows FDI as a share of total FDI going to developing countries.
Source: FDI data is from the UNCTAD database (constant 2000 US Dollars).
Table 2: Panel Data Models: Regional Dummies
Africa South Asia East Asia Latin America
Noorbakhsh and Youssef (2001) (+/-) (+/-)
Edwards (1990) (+) (+/-)
Asiedu (2002) (-)
Jaspersen et al. (2000) (-)
Ancharaz (2002) (+/-)
Gani (2007) (-)
Wilhelms and Witter (1998) (-) (+)
Addison and Heshmati (2003) (+/-) (-) (+) (+)
Yang (2007) (-)
Hein (1992) (+/-) (+/-)
Note: (-), (+) and (+/-) indicate a signicant negative, a signicant positive and an insignicant
regional dummy at a 10% signicance level, respectively.
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Table 3: Regional Studies (Return Variables)
Africa Asia Latin America
Market potential
GDP (+/-) Ancharaz (2002) (+/-) Frenkel et a l. (2004) (+ ) Bengoa et al. (2003)
(+ ) Asiedu (2005,2006) (+ ) Frenkel et a l. (2004)
(+ ) Morisset (2000) (-) Campos and K inosh ita (2008)
Population size (+ ) Tuman and Emmert (1999)
GDP Per cap ita (-) Ancharaz (2002) (+/-) Wezel (2003) (+ ) Ferris et a l. (1997)
(+/-) Lem i and Asefa (2003) (-) Nasser (2007) (+/-) Tuman and Emmert (1999, 2004)
(+ ) Asiedu et al. (2007) (+ ) Quazi (2007a) (+ ) Campos and K inosh ita (2008)
(+/-) Wezel (2003)
(+/-) Nasser (2007)
G rowth (+/-) Ancharaz (2002) (+/-) Frenkel et a l. (2004) (+/-) Nasser (2007)
(+/-) Jasp ersen et al. (2000) (+/-) Frenkel et a l. (2004)
(+ ) Onyeiwu et al. (2004) (+/-) Tuman and Emmert (1999)
(+ ) Naudé and Krugell (2007) (+ ) Nasser (2007) (+ ) Tuman and Emmert (2004)
Agglom eration
FDI lagged (+ ) Naudé and Krugell (2007) (+/-) Wezel (2003) (+/-) Tuman and Emmert (1999)
(+ ) Asiedu et al. (2007) (+ ) Nasser (2007) (+ ) Nasser (2007)
(+ ) Tuman and Emmert (2004)
(+ ) Wezel (2003)
Urban Population (+/-) Morisset (2000)
Factor markets
Labour market
S ize of lab our force (-) Lem i and Asefa (2003)
Wages (-) Wezel (2003) (+/-) Wezel (2003)
Illiteracy rate (+ ) Asiedu (2005, 2006)
(+ ) Lem i and Asefa (2003)
(+/-) M orisset (2000)
(+ ) Naudé and Krugell (2007)
School enrolm ent (+/-) Nasser (2007) (+ ) Tuman and Emmert (2004)
(+ ) Nasser (2007)
(+/-) Tuman and Emmert (1999)
Value added (productiv ity) (+ ) Lem i and Asefa (2003)
Natural ressource availab ility (+ ) Morisset (2000) (+ ) Campos and K inosh ita (2008)
(+ ) Onyeiwu et al. (2004)
(+ ) Asiedu (2005, 2006)
(+ ) Asiedu et al. (2007)
Capita l m arket
Domestic investm ent (+ ) Ancharaz (2002)
(+ ) Naudé and Krugell (2007)
Real interest rate (-) Lem i and Asefa (2003)
(+/-) Onyeiwu et al. (2004)
Domestic market access
In frastructure
Number of veh icles (+ ) Ferris et a l. (1997)
Railways/roads (+/-) Bengoa et al. (2003)
Telephone lines (+/-) Lem i and Asefa (2003) (+ ) Nasser (2007) (+ ) Nasser (2007)
(+/-) M orisset (2000)
(+ ) Asiedu (2005, 2006) (+ ) Campos and K inosh ita (2008)
(+/-) Onyeiwu et al. (2004)
(+ ) Asiedu et al. (2007)
Econom ic adjustm ent p eriod (-) Tuman and Emmert (1999)
L ib eralisation index (+ ) Campos and K inosh ita (2008)
Privatisation (+ ) Campos and K inosh ita (2008)
Corp orate taxes (-) Onyeiwu et al. (2004)
Trade taxes (-) Scho eman et al. (2000) (-) Wezel (2003) (+ ) Wezel (2003)
International op enness
Import (+ ) Ferris et a l. (1997)
(+/-) Tuman and Emmert (1999)
Export (+ ) Lem i and Asefa (2003) (-) Ferris et a l. (1997)
(+/-) Tuman and Emmert (1999)
Total trade (+ ) Morisset (2000) (+ ) Tuman and Emmert (2004)
(+ ) Asiedu (2005,2006) (+/-) Wezel (2003) (+/-) Wezel (2003)
(+ ) Onyeiwu et al. (2004) (+/-) Nasser (2007) (+ ) Nasser (2007)
(+/-) Ancharaz (2002)
Trade p olic ies
Investm ent treaties (+/-) Lem i and Asefa (2003)
M IGA (-) Lem i and Asefa (2003)
Free Trade Areas (+/-) Tuman and Emmert (2004)
International tourists (+/-) Lem i and Asefa (2003)
Geography
Latitude (+ ) Naudé and Krugell (2007)
E levation (+/-) Naudé and Krugell (2007)
D istance or b order (-) Frenkel et a l. (2004) (-) Frenkel et a l. (2004)
Note: (-), (+ ) and (+/-) ind icate a sign icant negative, a sign icant p ositive and an insign icant exp lanatory variab le at a 10%
sign icance level, resp ectively.
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Table 4: Regional Studies (Risk Variables)
Africa Asia Latin America
Econom ic risk
Ination (-) Naudé and Krugell (2007) (+/-) Tuman and Emmert (1999, 2004)
(-) A siedu (2005, 2006) (+/-) Nasser (2007) (-) Nasser (2007)
(-) Onyeiwu et al. (2004) (+/-) Frenkel et a l. (2004) (-) Campos and K inosh ita (2008)
(-) Bengoa et al. (2003)
(+/-) Frenkel et a l. (2004)
Variance of ination (+/-) Lem i and Asefa (2003)
Current account balance (+/-) Nasser (2007) (+ ) Nasser (2007)
Exchange rate
Exchange rate variab ility (+/-) Lem i and Asefa (2003) (+/-) Wezel (2003) (+/-) Wezel (2003)
(-) Ancharaz (2002) (+/-) Tuman and Emmert (1999, 2004)
F ixed exchange rate dummy (+ ) Frenkel et a l. (2004) (+/-) Frenkel et a l. (2004)
F inancia l stab ility
External debt (-) Lem i and Asefa (2003) (+/-) Wezel (2003) (+/-) Wezel (2003)
(+/-) Onyeiwu et al. (2004) (-) Bengoa et al. (2003)
Debt serv ice record (-) Ancharaz (2002) (+ ) Baumgarten and Hausman (2000)
International reserves (-) Onyeiwu et al. (2004)
Overall ind ices
Index of econom ic freedom (+ ) Bengoa et al. (2003)
ICRG (+/-) Wezel (2003) (+ ) Wezel (2003)
Euromoney (+ ) Frenkel et a l. (2004) (+/-) Frenkel et a l. (2004)
(+/-) Wezel (2003) (+/-) Wezel (2003)
Political risk
Politica l instab ility
Politica l risk index (-) Naudé and Krugell (2007) (-) Baumgarten and Hausman (2000)
Politica l v io lence (-) A siedu (2005, 2006) (+ ) Nasser (2007) (-) Nasser (2007)
(-) Tuman and Emmert (1999, 2004)
Politica l freedom index (+ ) Lem i and Asefa (2003) (+/-) Ferris et a l. (1997)
(+/-) Onyeiwu et al. (2004) (+ ) Tuman and Emmert (2004)
Politica l rights (+/-) Nasser (2007) (+ ) Nasser (2007)
Executive constra ints (-) Campos and K inosh ita (2008)
Corruption
Corruption index (-) A siedu et al. (2007)
(-) A siedu (2005, 2006)
Governm ent size (+/-) Ancharaz (2002)
(+ ) Naudé and Krugell (2007)
Accountab ility (-) Naudé and Krugell (2007)
Commercial risk
Investm ent clim ate
Openness to FDI (+ ) Asiedu (2006)
(+ ) Asiedu et al. (2007)
Expropriation (settler m ortality) (+/-) Naudé and Krugell (2007)
Business environm ent
Bureaucratic quality (+/-) Campos and K inosh ita (2008)
Institutional quality (+/-) Ancharaz (2002)
Regulatory burden (+ ) Naudé and Krugell (2007)
Rule of law index (+ ) Naudé and Krugell (2007) (+ ) Campos and K inosh ita (2008)
(+ ) Asiedu (2005, 2006)
(+ ) Asiedu et al. (2007)
F inancia l risk index (+/-) Campos and K inosh ita (2008)
Note: (-), (+ ) and (+/-) ind icate a sign icant negative, a sign icant p ositive and an insign icant exp lanatory variab le at a 10%
sign icance level, resp ectively.
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Table 5: List of Variables
Variable Description Source
GDP GDP in constant 2000 US dollars WDI (2007)
Population Population, total (millions) WDI (2007)
GDP per capita GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars WDI (2007)
Growth Growth of GDP in constant 2000 US dollars WDI (2007)
Urban population Urban population (% of total population) WDI (2007)
Size of labour force Labour force, total (millions) WDI (2007)
Labour earning Estimated earned income (male plus female) UNDP
Education Education index (lies between 0 and 1) UNDP
Fuel Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports) WDI (2007)
Ores Ores and metals exports (% of merchandise exports) WDI (2007)
Land area Total land area in square kilometres WDI (2007)
Return to investment log(1/GDP per capita) WDI (2007)
Roads Total network in kilometres WDI (2007)
Telephone lines Telephone mainlines per 1,000 people WDI (2007)
Internet Internet users per 1,000 people WDI (2007)
Taxes Tax revenue (% of GDP) WDI (2007)
Import Import (% of GDP) WDI (2007)
Export Export (% of GDP) WDI (2007)
Total trade Trade, total (% of GDP) WDI (2007)
Ination Ination, consumer prices (annual %) WDI (2007)
Current account balance Current account balance (% of GDP) WDI (2007)
Change in exchange rate Change in real exchange rate: exch(t)-log exch(t-1) WDI (2007)
Variance of exchange rate Variance of real exchange rate: std of exch WDI (2007)
External debt External debt, total (% of GDP) WDI (2007)
Debt service record Debt service, total (% of GNI) WDI (2007)
Reserves Reserves, total (includes gold, current US$) WDI (2007)
Government expenditure Government nal consumption expenditure (% of GDP) WDI (2007)
Political risk Std of government expenditure WDI (2007)
Corruption Kaufmann et al. (2007)
Voice and accountability Kaufmann et al. (2007)
Bureaucratic quality Kaufmann et al. (2007)
Government e¢ ciency Kaufmann et al. (2007)
Rule of law index Kaufmann et al. (2007)
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Table 6: PcGets Results: Return and Risk Variables (Trade)
All countries Africa Asia Latin America
GDP per capita -0.001***
[0.0001]
Growth 0.423** 0.419*** 1.330*** 0.417***
[0.186] [0.119] [0.383] [0.043]
Urban population 0.188*** -0.055***
[0.0669] [0.003]
Earn -0.205* -0.695***
[0.107] [0.197]
Ores 0.055***
[0.004]
Landarea 0.738***
[0.233]
Roads -0.014**
[0.007]
Telephone 0.031*** 0.026***
[0.011] [0.002]
Tax rate -0.009
[0.007]
Trade 0.010 0.033*** 0.014***
[0.011] [0.006] [0.003]
Ination -0.016*** -0.005*** -0.041*** -0.217*
[0.003] [0.001] [0.007] [0.001]
Current account -0.339*** -0.675*** 0.185***
[0.097] [0.166] [0.033]
External debt -2.861** -1.095***
[1.092] [0.331]
Change in exchange rate -0.077** -0.270*** -0.002***
[0.031] [0.071] [0.006]
Variance of the exchange rate -0.226** 0.805** 0.134***
[0.110] [0.361] [0.021]
International reserves -3.475**
[1.602]
Government expenditure 6.047**
[2.350]
Corruption -3.181** -1.728***
[1.395] [0.263]
Law 3.387*** 0.677* 0.759***
[1.241] [0.344] [0.237]
Political rights 1.682**
[0.712]
Voice and accountability 7.202***
[1.759]
RSS 816 18 344 4
Number of observations 100 43 35 22
Adjusted R-squared 0.39 0.78 0.64 0.88
Note: A constant term is included but not reported. Diagnostic tests include residual autocorrelation,
ARCH, heteroscedasticity, functional form mis-specication and non-normality. ***, ** and * indicate
signicance on a 1, 5 and 10 percent signicance level. Standard errors are in paranthesis.
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Table 7: PcGets Results: Return and Risk Variables (Import and Export)
All countries Africa Asia Latin America
GDP per capita -0.001***
[0.0003]
Growth 0.431** 0.412*** 1.330*** 0.472***
[0.207] [0.118] [0.383] [0.041]
Urban population 0.188*** -0.056***
[0.0669] [0.003]
Earn -0.695***
[0.197]
Ores 0.066***
[0.005]
Landarea 0.556**
[0.218]
Roads -0.020**
[0.007]
Telephone 0.035*** 0.034***
[0.012] [0.003]
Import 0.0061 0.064*** 0.037***
[0.042] [0.011] [0.005]
Ination -0.014*** -0.005*** -0.041*** -0.003***
[0.003] [0.001] [0.007] [0.001]
Current account -0.338*** -0.675*** 0.171***
[0.105] [0.166] [0.035]
External debt -2.553** -0.747*
[1.117] [0.340]
Change in exchange rate -0.063** -0.270*** -0.029***
[0.029] [0.071] [0.006]
Variance of the exchange rate -0.227** 0.805** 0.161***
[0.111] [0.361] [0.021]
International reserves -5.112***
[1.915]
Government expenditure 7.910***
[2.561]
Corruption -3.454** -1.557***
[1.372] [0.191
Law 2.870**
[1.271]
Political rights 1.682**
[0.712]
Voice and accountability 7.202***
[1.759]
Number of observations 100 43 35 22
Adjusted R-squared 0.38 0.78 0.64 0.87
Note: See Table 6.
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Measuring Idiosyncratic Risk: Implications for
Capital Flows
Eva Rytter Suneseny
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
Abstract
This paper o¤ers a rened risk measure based on the variance of GDP growth.
First, we condition growth on structural characteristics of the host country that
move only slowly and therefore can be partly predicted by the investor. Second, we
adjust for the systematic components due to global and regional interdependence
between alternative investment locations. The decomposition of risk into its sys-
tematic and idiosyncratic components reveals that not only are African countries
on average characterised by a larger conditional risk than Asian and Latin Amer-
ican countries, but the idiosyncratic risk factor also represents a larger share than
in other developing countries. Finally, using a general-to-specic methodology, we
nd that both economic and political risk factors are important elements in the
investment decision. The commercial aspect of risk is, however, poorly dened.
Keywords: Foreign direct investment, risk decomposition
JEL classications: E32, F21, O16, C23
1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has become an important source of capital in developing
countries during the last decade with FDI inows more than tripling since the mid 1990s.
Despite e¤orts to improve the investment climate, see UNCTAD (1999), the regional
distribution of FDI has been heavily biased against the poor African countries. This
means that in spite of absolute increases in FDI inows throughout the period, Africa has
experienced a drop in FDI inows relative to other developing countries.
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and Finn Tarp.
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While a large part of the empirical literature on FDI has focussed mainly on the tra-
ditional low-return explanation of insu¢ cient FDI inows to certain developing countries,
more recent studies have applied various risk measures to control for the country risk
of investing abroad. The importance of risk stems from the fact that, in the face of the
uncertainty connected to foreign investments, the objective of investors is to maximise the
expected return of their investment. This means that risk becomes a critical element in
the investment decision. Since aggregate data on returns to FDI is generally unavailable
for a satisfactory number of countries for a su¢ cient number of years, it is impossible to
capture risk by the variance of such returns. Basically, empirical papers on FDI and risk
can be grouped into two according to the way they proxy for country risk.
First, a large part of the literature has included various economic, political and com-
mercial risk measures. While there seems to have been reached a consensus on the im-
portance of economic risk (and which proxies to include), the inclusion of political and
commercial risk measures has been more ad hoc and a large variety of proxies have been
tested. The second branch of the literature has applied a selection of volatility measures
to capture risk. Suggested volatility measures have been based on ination, exchange
rates or terms of trade, but the most frequently used risk proxy is the variance of GDP
growth. This paper provides a bridge between these two empirical methodologies.
Since the variance of GDP growth can only be interpreted as idiosyncratic country risk
when events are unpredictable, this paper o¤ers a renement that serves to take out the
structural and systematic components of the variance of GDP growth. We proceed in two
steps. First, we derive a conditional risk measure by drawing on the augmented Solow
(1956) growth model to account for the structural characteristics of the host country
that move only slowly and therefore can be partly predicted by the investor. Second, by
using a principal components analysis (PCA) we adjust for the systematic risk caused by
global and regional business cycle e¤ects. In the end, this exercise allows us to decompose
conditional risk into its global, regional and idiosyncratic risk components.
Results show that not only are African countries on average characterised by a higher
conditional risk, but idiosyncratic country risk also constitutes a larger share of total risk
as compared with Asian and Latin American countries. This means that the puzzling
combination of relatively high rates of return in Africa, the average return on US invest-
ment to Africa over the period 1983-97 was 23% compared with 21% for Asia & Pacic
and 12% for Latin America & Caribbean as documented in UNCTAD (1999), and low
inows of FDI to African countries. This paper suggests that the relevant measure for
comparison should be the expected rate of return, that is returns adjusted for idiosyncratic
country risk.
As a nal exercise we are interested in systematically analysing how the rened risk
measure correlates with the economic, political and commercial risk measures suggested
in the empirical FDI literature. Overall, we conclude that both economic and political risk
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variables are important determinants of idiosyncratic risk whereas the commercial aspects
of risk are poorly dened. Rather than including various risk measures on an ad hoc basis,
our results indicate that the ability of a country to service its debt, the current account
balance, government consumption, democratic accountability and external conicts are
important determinants of risk.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 derives a rened risk measure that conditions
total risk on slowly moving economic fundamentals of the host economy and takes the
systematic risk components due to global and regional integration into account. Using
econometric tools, we are then able to decompose total risk into its conditional, systematic
and idiosyncratic components. Section 3 applies a general-to-specic framework to select
those economic, political and commercial risk measures that best describe idiosyncratic
risk. Finally, Section 4 summarises and concludes.
2 A Rened Measure of Risk
The increased attention towards explaining FDI ows by expected returns has highlighted
the need to take risk into account. Since aggregate data on returns to FDI is generally
unavailable it is impossible to capture risk by the variance of such returns. The starting
point in this paper is the variance of GDP growth to capture overall risk, which has
been done by Hausmann and Gavin (1995), Ramey and Ramey (1995), Servén (1998),
and Calderón, Loyaza and Servén (2003) among others. The focus on GDP growth is
motivated by the new growth literature, which argues that GDP growth per worker reects
the most important elements of economic policy and performance. Not only does it reect
the market potential of an economy (the strength of local demand), as highlighted by
Guiso and Parigi (1998), but eventually all ine¢ ciencies, instabilities and incapabilities
of an economy will show up in the growth rate. This argument is conrmed by Calderón,
Loayza and Servén (2003) who nd that when stock-market returns are regressed on other
underlying indicators (ination, exchange rate, political and nancial risk), GDP growth
takes the bulk of the explained variance of returns.
Yet, it is quite obvious that variability only amounts to risk when events are unpre-
dictable and a rened measure of risk is therefore required.1 First, we derive a conditional
risk measure by taking out the part of GDP growth caused by growth determinants that
move only slowly and therefore can be partly predicted by the investor. Second, since
countries are interdependent there will be some systematic components in the local re-
turn to investment that will depend on common global and regional factors. Adjusting for
such structural and systematic factors will give us an improved measure of idiosyncratic
1This statement was stressed by Servén (1998) who draws the distinction between sample variation and
uncertainty. The argument is that the former may overstate the latter by including not only truly unpre-
dictable innovations to the variables of interest, but possibly also (cyclical) movements partly predictable
from the past.
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country risk.
2.1 Adjustment for Economic Fundamentals
Proxying the return to investment with GDP growth, we can decompose actual return
into a predictable part, x0it, and an unpredictable part, "it,
 ln(yit) = x
0
it + "it, (1)
where yit is real GDP per worker in country i at time t, xit is a vector of economic
fundamentals identied from the neoclassical and endogenous growth literature, and "it
is the growth residual.2 While the variance of growth has previously been used as a
measure of risk, this paper has made the case that 2"i is a better proxy for country risk.
We will call this conditional risk since we condition risk on slowly moving factors partly
predictable from their own past.
The methodology behind the growth regression is based on the convergence literature,
most notably Islam (1995), where the growth regression in a panel data setting can be
presented as
 ln(yit) = i+ (  1) ln yit 1+ 0 ln(nit+ g+ ) + 1 ln(invit) + 2 ln(openit) + "it, (2)
where i is an unobserved country-specic time-invariant constant reecting among other
things the initial level of e¢ ciency, possibly inuenced by institutional settings, geographic
characteristics and cultural norms, and where the lagged dependent variable, ln yit 1,
captures the tendency of an economy to converge to its steady state. nit is the growth
rate of the labour force, g is technological advancement and  is the rate of depreciation.
In line with Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) we assume (g + ) to be the same for all
countries and equal to 0.05. Capital accumulation is the main driver of growth in the
traditional Solow model and we therefore include total investment as a share of GDP,
invit. Finally, following Beaudry, Collard and Green (2005) we include total trade as a
share of GDP, openit. Income per capita, investment, openness and population are from
Penn World Tables 6.1. Due to errors in the demographic time series, as documented
by Dowrick (2005), data on the labour force are taken from the World Development
Indicators (2005).3 The model applies annual data for a sample of 126 developed and
2We assume that growth and return are linearly and positively correlated. However, foreign investors
might face increasing factor prices and scarce resources in countries where FDI inows have increased
a lot over a short period of time. This means that there will be some second order e¤ects that are not
captured by the simple linear relationship dened in this paper.
3Human capital enters as a fundamental growth determinant in the augmented Solow model. However,
since typical human capital variables (average years of schooling or school enrolment rates) are available
only with ve year intervals such variables have been excluded. In addition, we do not include time
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Table 1: Growth Determinants
POLS FE GMM-DIF GMM-SYS
constant 0.009 0.123** -0.061
[0.027] [0.049] [0.059]
ln(yt 1) -0.004** -0.053* -0.186*** -0.005
[0.002] [0.007] [0.040] [0.006]
ln(n+ g + d) -0.019** -0.037*** -0.045 -0.058***
[0.009] [0.012] [0.045] [0.022]
ln(inv) 0.015*** 0.011*** -0.055*** 0.023***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.021] [0.006]
ln(open) -0.011 0.004 0.041** -0.015***
[0.002] [0.006] [0.016] [0.005]
Note: Dependent variable is growth in GDP per worker. Heteroscedastic consistent standard errors
in brackets. *** signicant at 1%, ** signicant at 5%, * signicant at 10%.
developing countries.
Various methods have been used to estimate the growth regression. In the presence of
unobserved country-specic e¤ects and a lagged dependent variable, Hsiao (1986) shows
that the pooled OLS estimate (POLS) of the coe¢ cient on the lagged dependent vari-
able is upwards biased, and Nickell (1981) shows that the Fixed E¤ects (FE) estimator
is downwards biased. We therefore turn to the rst-di¤erences Generalised Method of
Moments (GMM-DIF) estimator, originally developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen
(1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991), which produces consistent estimates in the dynamic
growth relation.
However, when the time series are persistent ( close to unity) the GMM-DIF esti-
mator is poorly behaved. The reason is that, under such conditions, lagged levels of the
variables are only weak instruments for subsequent rst-di¤erences. We therefore turn
to the system GMM (GMM-SYS) estimator suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and
Blundell and Bond (1998). All estimators are based on the e¢ cient two-step estimator
to allow for heteroscedasticity in the residuals. Since the two-step GMM estimators have
the disadvantage of converging to their asymptotic distribution relatively slowly we com-
pensate by using the nite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix derived
by Windmeijer (2005). Investment, openness and population growth rates are treated as
endogenous variables in the GMM estimators, which means that instruments should be
lagged two periods or more to be valid. All regressions are carried out using STATA.
Results are reported in Table 1.
The results are largely in line with other empirical studies; see for example Bond,
Hoe­ er and Temple (2001). Unexpectedly, open enters negatively in the regression, which
is also the case in the Beaudry, Collard and Green (2005) IV5 regression for the period
dummies since these are not predictable by foreign investors. Tests show, however, that our results are
robust to the inclusion of time dummies.
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1978-98. One explanation could be a business cycle e¤ect due to long-term contracts,
which means that trade lags behind income in a boom. Working with annual data this
means that the covariance between openness (trade as a share of GDP) and growth will
be negative. It is worth noticing that the coe¢ cient on the lagged dependent variable
is lower than in other studies. This is because we use annual observations rather than
the typical 4 or 5-year averages. In this case the persistency of the income data will be
higher (high ) and, consequently, that the rate of convergence will be lower. Given the
high persistence in the income data we base our subsequent analysis on residuals from
the GMM-SYS estimator.
2.2 Adjusting for Global and Regional Interdependence
Albuquerque, Loayza and Servén (2002) and Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003), among
others, argue that the close trading and investment relationships between countries give
rise to a global business cycle. This means that the global investment climate will a¤ect
the return to investment in individual countries and regions. In our context, the presence
of a global return component means that a component in the unpredictable return, "it,
varies systematically across countries. To capture this, we dene a single-index model
based on the assumption that the common return component, !t, enters linearly in the
country-specic return.4 Now, the unpredictable return component (the growth residual)
can be written as
"^it = i!!t + eit, eit  IID(0; 2ei), (3)
where i! reects the degree to which global return factors spill over into local return (the
degree of global integration). i!!t can be interpreted as the part of local return that is
attributable to the global investment climate. Now, eit is the local return adjusted both
for the structural characteristics of the host economy and the systematic component due
to global investment conditions. ^2ei therefore gives a rened measure of country risk.
Not only are returns in individual countries a¤ected by global factors but countries
belonging to the same region are also likely to be a¤ected by common shocks. The regional
return component could be explained by the fact that many multinational rms locate in
one country but serve markets in the whole region. Also political, economic and social ties
between countries within a region (often enhanced by the signing of Regional Integration
Agreements) mean that shocks to one country spill over to the other countries in the
region.
4For simplicity the degree of global and regional spillovers are assumed to be constant over time. This
is not completely in line with empirical observations since one of the most signicant features about the
global economy of the past few decades has been the move towards closer and more open trading systems
and investment relationships between countries. However, this assumption is necessary to make the index
model operational.
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The existence of a regional market seeking motive of foreign investors has been con-
rmed by Veugelers (1991), Chakrabarti (1997, 2003), Méon and Sekkat (2002), Sethi et
al. (2003), Jaumotte (2004), and Carstensen and Toubal (2004), and the importance of
the macroeconomic and political situation of neighbouring countries has been examined
by Ades and Chua (1997), and Easterly and Levine (2000).
To capture the regional aspect of local return, we dene an indicator of regional
belonging, Iik, that takes on the value one if country i belongs to region k and zero
otherwise. We then dene a regional return component,  kt, common to all countries in
region k but varying over time, that enters linearly in the local return of country i
e^it =
KX
k=1
ikIik kt + uit, uit  IID(0; 2ui), (4)
where ik is the spillover from the regional investment climate to the local, and  kt is
return in region k at time t. Now, ^ik ^ kt can be interpreted as the part of country return
that is attributable to the investment climate in region k. Under such circumstances
^2ui is the relevant measure of idiosyncratic country risk since it is adjusted for both the
structural and systematic components.
Empirically, !^t can be estimated as the rst principal component of "^it, where ^i! is
the factor loading reecting the degree of global spillover. Since the PCA methodology
requires full time series for the growth residual, the 126 countries from the growth regres-
sion are reduced to 92 developed and developing countries that enter the global PCA. It
is worth noticing that the sign of i! and !t are not identied individually. Based on
the belief that the United States is a dominant player in the global economy, we have
normalised the sign of i! and !t to ensure that cov(!t; "USA;t) > 0.
By symmetry, ^ kt can be obtained as the rst principal component from a region-
by-region PCA of e^it, where ^ik is the factor loading reecting the degree of regional
spillover. Again, the sign of ^ kt and ^ik are not identied individually and we normalise
the sign to ensure that the largest economy in the region (in terms of GDP) is positively
correlated with regional return, cov( t; eDYNAMO;t) > 0. The argument is that the largest
economy often functions as a regional dynamo and we wish to ensure that there is a
positive connection between the dynamo and the regional business cycle. The dynamos
are South Africa (Africa), Brazil (Latin America) and China (Asia).
Figure 1 depicts the time pattern of the global and regional principal components, !^t
and ^ kt. On average, the global component explains 14% of total variance. The Asian
principal component is the strongest explaining 21% of the residual variance, whereas the
Latin American and African components explain 17% and 11%, respectively. The global
return component is quite volatile and tests reject that it is constant over time. The
global return picks up the economic downturns in conjunction with the two oil crisis in
1973 and 1979. It also shows a more stabilised economy during the 1980s as well as the
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upturn in the mid 1990s.
Tests also reject the hypothesis that the regional return components are constant over
time. During the rst two decades, the African return component was quite volatile
but the region has stabilised during the late 1980s and 1990s at a relatively high level
compared with Asia and Latin America. The Asian return component, on the other hand,
has been stable and most often positive except for the Asian crisis that comes through
strongly in the return component in the late 1990s. Finally, the Latin American debt
crisis in the early 1980s shows up clearly in the regional return.
Figure 1. Global and Regional Principal Components
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Note: The gure shows the development in !^t and ^ kt over time. The principal components have
been normalised to ensure that the global component is positively correlated with US return and that
the regional component is positively correlated with the dominant country in the particular region.
The PCA methodology ensures that the covariance between the two indices is zero
(E[!t kt] = 0), and that the residual is uncorrelated with each index (E([!tuit] =
E([ ktuit] = 0).5 Together this means that conditional risk can be decomposed as
2"i = 
2
i!
2
! + 
2
ik
2k + 
2
ui, (5)
where 2i!
2
! is the global risk factor, 
2
ik
2k is the regional risk factor and 
2
ui is the
idiosyncratic country risk factor. Table 2 shows the risk decomposition for the three
regions.6
5Since the regional return components, kt, are derived from PCA on a region-by-region basis, the
correlation between the regional return components is not zero by construction. However, the correlations
turn out to be low which is not surprising given the correction for a common factor in the global PCA
analysis.
6Individual results for the 67 developing countries for which coherent data was available can be ob-
tained from the author upon request.
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Table 2: Risk Decomposition
Conditional Global Regional Idiosyncratic
2"i 
2
i!
2
!=
2
"i 
2
ik
2k=
2
"i 
2
ui=
2
"i
Africa 0.450 0.056 0.112 0.833
Latin America 0.212 0.120 0.152 0.728
Asia 0.118 0.074 0.216 0.711
Note: Decomposes conditional risk into the global, regional and idiosyncratic components.
On average, the conditional risk of investing in Africa (0.450) is signicantly higher
than investing in Latin America (0.212) or in Asia (0.118). The Latin American countries
are the most a¤ected by global conditions: in Latin America the global risk factor explains
12% of the total variance as opposed to 7% in Asia and 6% in Africa. On a regional basis,
the Asian spillover e¤ect is the strongest, and the Asian return factor explains close to 22%
of the total variance. In Latin America and Africa the regional factor accounts for 15%
and 11%, respectively. Overall, this means that idiosyncratic country risk accounts for
84% of total risk in Africa, but only 73% and 71% in Latin America and Asia, respectively.
The high proportion of idiosyncratic high in total risk is in line with Kose, Otrok and
Whiteman (2003). Since idiosyncratic risk is the relevant measure of country risk, the low
level of investment in African countries might be explained not only by a large total risk
but more importantly by a large proportion of conditional risk being idiosyncratic risk.
3 What Determines Country Risk?
Having now adjusted for the structural part of country risk due to economic fundamen-
tals as well as the systematic risk components due to global and regional business cycle
synchronisation, we are left with a measure of idiosyncratic country risk that enables us
to carry out an analysis of which factors inuence idiosyncratic risk. This section there-
fore applies econometric tools to select among the various risk measures included in the
empirical FDI literature the most signicant determinants of country risk. That is, we
estimate
^2ui = x
0
i + i, (6)
where xi is a vector of economic, political and commercial risk measures.7 Where nothing
else is mentioned, the variables have been calculated as averages (or variances) over the
time period 1970-2000.8 Data availability means that we end up with 35 potential risk
7A full survey of the applied risk measures can be obtained from the author upon request. We include
in our list of explanatory variables as many as possible of the suggested risk measures. However, since
some papers focus on bilateral FDI ows, include only a selection of countries (for example transition
economies) or calculate their own risk measures using econometric tools (such as GARCH or factor
analysis) we will not be able to collect all the variables applied in the FDI literature.
8Notice than some of the variables are available only for the latter part of the period and this might
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measures for a cross-section of 60 developing countries.
3.1 Description of Variables
Following Nordal (2001) we divide country risk into economic, political and commercial
risk. Economic risk is risk related to the macroeconomic development of the host country
that may inuence the protability of an investment. Political risk is the uncertainty
associated with changes in government policy upon the cash ow accruing to rms and
investors. Commercial risk is risk related to the specic investment, such as the risk
related to the fullment of contracts with private companies and local partners.
Economic risk is mainly related to exchange rate risk, ination and economic insta-
bility. Exchange rate risk contributes to transfer risk (the risk of potential restrictions on
the ability to remit funds across national borders) since a depreciating real exchange rate
means that the real value of the foreign investment will be undermined. In line with An-
charaz (2002), Deichmann (2001), Kamaly (2002) and Wezel (2003) we therefore include
a measure of exchange rate variability. Given the non-stationarity of the real exchange
rate we take the variance of the log-di¤erence rather than the level (vrexch). Also, as
argued by Lemi and Asefa (2003) and Garibaldi et al. (2002), a constant real exchange
rate is preferred by foreign investors since it is a sign of economic stability. We therefore
supplement with the average log-di¤erence of the real exchange rate (crexch).
A high rate of ination often results from excessively expansive monetary and scal
policies. A record of high and unpredictable ination creates uncertainty regarding the net
present value of a costly long-term investment, and potential direct investors may perceive
di¢ culty even in making short-term pricing decisions. Hence, we take the frequently
applied level of ination (infl) as well as the variance of ination (vinfl) as suggested
by Lemi and Asefa (2003).
An economically stable economy will be relatively more attractive. A highly indebted
country, measured by external debt as a share of GDP (exdebt), the debt-service ratio
(debtserv) or long-term debt as a share of GDP (longdebt), induces investors to
anticipate future tax liabilities to service the debt and to expect political turmoil. Another
measure of economic stability, applied by Kamaly (2002) and Onyeiwu and Shrestha
(2004), is the availability of international reserves (intres) since foreign investors regard
large international reserves as reecting a vital host economy. Finally, the government
decit as a share of GDP (deficit) and the current account balance as a share of GDP
(caccount) have been used as indicators of government credibility since the presence of
such imbalances may weaken the availability of external credit and spur expectations of
higher future tax liabilities.
cause problems in identifying a signicant association with idiosyncratic risk. However, these variables
have nevertheless been applied in the empirical literature which is why they are included here.
39
The importance of political risk has been increasingly acknowledged since the late
1990s. Within the set of political risk measures one can distinguish between indicators
of political instability, corruption and democracy. Political instability is likely to have
an impact on foreign investors for several reasons. First, the emergence of revolutionary
movements (or civil wars) in host countries has the capacity to destruct private property
and increase uncertainty about the security of property rights, a key consideration for
rms holding non-liquid assets. Second, such episodes may undermine the production of
goods, transportation of products and sales in domestic markets. Third, such incidents
may disrupt the economic process and postpone important reforms.
We capture political instability by the Kaufmann et al. (2005) index of political
instability and violence (stability) as well as the standard deviation of the share of
government consumption in GDP (govcon) applied by Ancharaz (2002).9 In addition,
we include selected ICRG subcomponents: the governments ability to carry out its de-
clared programs and its ability to stay in o¢ ce (govstab), internal political violence
and civil disorder (internal), external conicts (external), military participation in
government (military), religious tensions (religion) and ethnic tensions due to racial,
nationality or language divisions (ethnic).
Even in the presence of a conductive macroeconomic environment, corruption can
deter investors from doing business. Corruption distorts the economic and nancial envi-
ronment thereby raising operating costs, it reduces the e¢ ciency of government and busi-
ness by slowing down the bureaucratic process, and it destabilises the political process.
Three measures of corruption have been added. First, is the Kaufmann corruption index
(corruption), which measures the exercise of public power for private gain. Second, we
add the ICRG assessment of corruption within the political system (polcor). Finally, we
take government consumption as a share of GDP (gcon) based on the argument put for-
ward by Ancharaz (2002), Asiedu (2002) and Onyeiwu (2003) that it indicates economic
distortions, government ine¢ ciency and corruption.
Democracy is another aspect of a sound political environment. Authoritative regimes
are often associated with a greater risk of policy reversals, due for example to the dicta-
tors own desire, the need to raise public support through populist measures or simply
coups. Democratic regimes are also more likely to respect the rule of law and property
rights.10 To capture the e¤ects of democracy on risk, the voice and accountability vari-
able (voice) from Kaufmann et al. (2005) reecting political, civil and human rights
has been collected. In addition, the indicators from the Freedom House index have been
included individually: civil liberties (civil), political rights (polrights) and democracy
9The argument for including the latter stems from Brewer (1985) who argues that government agencies
are marked by a high degree of inertia and are unlikely to change except as a result of substantial shocks.
He therefore suggests that deviations of scal indicators (such as government spending) from their trends
can be used as a measure of government policy risk. This risk measure was rst used by Ancharaz (2002).
10See Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004) for further references on the impacts of democracy.
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(fhdemoc). To supplement, we include the ICRG measure of democratic accountability
(account) to capture the degree of tension within a country. Finally, the Marshall and
Jaggers (2002) institutionalised democracy index (pdemoc) and the Vanhanen (2000) in-
dex of democratisation (vdemoc) have been added to our list of political risk measures.
Commercial risk can be divided into measures of the quality of governance, rule of
law indicators and more specic variables reecting the investment climate. The quality of
governance is rst of all captured by the Kaufmann et al. (2005) indicator of government
e¤ectiveness (effect) supplemented with the "bureaucratic quality" indicator from the
ICRG (bureau).
The rule of law is the most frequently used commercial risk measure. The strength and
impartiality of the legal system and popular support for the law reect the degree to which
citizens are willing to accept the established institutions for making and implementing laws
and adjudicating disputes. The strength and impartiality of the legal system and popular
observance of the law are captured by the Kaufmann et al. (2005) rule of law indicator
(law) and the ICRG law and order indicator (order).
Indicators of the investment climate include an amalgamate of factors more directly
relevant to the foreign investor. A concrete measure of the investment climate is the
Kaufmann (2005) regulatory quality indicator (quality), which measures the incidence
of market-unfriendly policies. Also, we supplement with two ICRG subcomponents. First
is the measure of socioeconomic conditions (socio), which assesses the socioeconomic
pressures at work in the society (unemployment, consumer condence and poverty) that
could constrain government action or fuel social dissatisfaction. Second, we include the
investment prole component (profile), which is an assessment of factors a¤ecting con-
tract viability/expropriation, prots repatriation and payment delays. Finally, we add
the Heritage Foundation property rights index (prights).
3.2 Methodology and Results
In view of the large set of (possibly correlated) potential determinants of country risk, it is
a challenge to maintain a reasonable degree of parsimony while avoiding misspecication of
the model. To deal with this, we use a general-to-specic model selection approach, which
enables us to "test down" among the large set of potential right-hand-side variables. We
use the PcGets software, which automatically selects an undominated, congruent model
where statistically insignicant variables are eliminated and where diagnostic tests check
the validity of reductions to ensure a congruent nal selection. There are many ways in
which a model can be simplied, so PcGets selects a multipath search strategy, exploring
the consequences of every initially-feasible path. We refer to Hendry (1995, Chapter 9)
for further details on the methodology.
Initially, we test the economic, political and commercial risk models separately and
41
the results are reported in Table 3 underneath. Column 1 shows that the external debt
(exdebt), the debt service ratio (debtserv), international reserves (intres) and the
current account (caccount) turn out to be robust and signicant economic determi-
nants of idiosyncratic country risk. As expected highly indebted countries with poor debt
services are perceived more risky since future tax liabilities are anticipated to be higher.
Likewise, a positive current account balance is indicative of a stable economic environment
and thus of lower risk. Surprisingly, the availability of international reserves increases risk
rather than lowering it. Since this result does not carry over into the combined model in
Column 4, we interpret the positive sign as being indicative of an omitted variable bias.
In Column 2, four out of the 18 proposed political risk measures turn out robust.
Government consumption as a share of GDP (gcon) reects economic distortions, gov-
ernment ine¢ ciency and corruption, and its positive correlation with risk is therefore to
be expected. The civil liberty variable (civil) ranges from one to seven where small
numbers indicate an established and generally equitable system of rule of law. The posi-
tive correlation with idiosyncratic risk conrms the perception that countries with strong
civil liberties are perceived less risky. The Vanhanen (2000) index of democratisation
(vdemoc) and the ICRG measure of democratic accountability (account) both cap-
ture the stabilising e¤ect of democracy. They are rated so that high values indicate a
more democratic regime and we would therefore expect them to enter negatively in the
regression. The fact that vdemoc has a positive sign suggests that as soon as we take
the accountability aspect of democracy into account, vdemoc actually captures some-
thing that is positively correlated with risk. However, as we will see from Column 4, the
signicance of this variable is not robust to the merger of the three models and we will
therefore not go into details with this preliminary and unstable result.
From Column 3 we see that only two out of the eight commercial risk variables turn
out to be signicant. Regulatory quality, high values of quality, lowers risk since it
indicates the incidence of market-friendly policies. Likewise, a high value of profile
indicates good contract enforcement and low risk of expropriation, prots repatriation
and payment delays. The explanatory power of the commercial risk variables is rather
low and overall we must conclude that the proposed commercial risk measures are not
very successful in describing idiosyncratic risk. This is conrmed in Column 4 where none
of the commercial risk proxies enter the combined model.
Column 4 shows that once we merge the three models debtserv, account, gcon
and account stay signicant while the remaining variables from Column 1-3 are not
robust to the inclusion of other risk variables. On the other hand, the prevalence of
external conicts (external) becomes a signicant determinant of idiosyncratic country
risk. Interestingly, when we carry out the general-to-specic exercise using total risk, the
variance of GDP growth, ^2 ln(yit);i, as the dependent variable
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^2 ln(yit);i = x
0
i + i, (7)
only the debt service ratio, the current account balance and government consumption turn
out signicant and robust. This is in line with Persson and Tabellini (2006) who nd that
democracy has no direct e¤ect on growth but there is a positive indirect e¤ect via higher
expected returns. However, once we adjust for the structural and systematic components
of risk we are able to pick up an e¤ect of democratic accountability on idiosyncratic risk.
Overall, the ve signicant risk measures account for close to 60 per cent of idiosyn-
cratic risk. Since there are obviously missing variables and serious endogeneity issues, we
need to turn to instrumental variable estimation methods, see for example Persson and
Tabellini (2006), in order to determine the direction of causality. This lies beyond the
scope of this paper. We conclude that several of the suggested individual risk measures
correlate signicantly with idiosyncratic risk but that one needs to be careful in selecting
individual measures. Our results also indicate that studies that focus solely on one type
of risk (typically economic risk) leave out important explanatory variables resulting in
biased and inconsistent results.
4 Summary and Conclusions
Although the inow of FDI to developing countries has increased tremendously during
the last decade, the regional distribution of such inows has been heavily biased against
the poor African countries. Empirical observations presented in this paper suggest that
the uneven distribution of FDI cannot be explained by a low return to investment in these
countries, and recent studies of FDI have increasingly turned attention towards country
risk as an explanation for the poor investment records of African countries. Ideally, the
appropriate risk measure would be the variance of returns, but since suitable measures
of rates of return to FDI are rarely available, papers linking FDI to risk have rested on
empirical proxies for country risk. While one group of studies includes various economic,
political and commercial risk measures, another set of papers apply various volatility
measures to proxy for risk. The most frequently applied volatility measure is the variance
of GDP growth.
This paper provides a bridge between these two empirical methodologies. Taking the
variance of GDP growth as the overall proxy for country risk, we argue that volatility
should only be interpreted as risk when events are unpredictable. This paper suggests
two renements that take out the structural and systematic components of total risk
thereby o¤ering an improved measure of idiosyncratic country risk. This exercise allows
us to decompose conditional risk (total risk adjusted for economic fundamentals) into its
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Table 3: Determinants of Idiosyncratic Risk
Economic Political Commercial Combined Combined
Risk measure ^2ui ^
2
ui ^
2
ui ^
2
ui ^
2
 ln(yit);i
exdebt 0.388**
[0.153]
debtserv -0.033*** -0.041* -0.038***
[0.012] [0.013] [0.014]
intres 1.233**
[0.560]
caccount -0.024** -0.033*** -0.042***
[0.012] [0.001] [0.007]
gcon 0.034*** 0.027*** 0.035***
[0.012] [0.001] [0.007]
civil 0.101**
[0.044]
vdemoc 0.037***
[0.019]
account -0.339*** -0.149***
[0.154] [0.041]
external 0.053***
[0.017]
quality -0.267***
[0.075]
profile -0.047***
[0.007]
R2 0.45 0.43 0.14 0.59 0.44
Note: Results from a general-to-specic analysis of 35 risk measures on idiosyncratic risk. The sample includes
60 developing countries. A constant was included but is not reported. Heteroscedastic consistent standard errors
in brackets.*** signicant at 1%, ** signicant at 5%, * signicant at 10%. The PcGets software package was used.
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global, regional and idiosyncratic risk components. Results suggest that the low level of
investment in African countries might be explained not only by a large conditional risk
but more importantly by a large proportion of this risk being idiosyncratic risk.
As a nal exercise, we utilise an econometric general-to-specic methodology to se-
lect robust indicators that describe the rened idiosyncratic country risk measure. We
conclude that both economic and political risk variables are important determinants of
idiosyncratic risk. Also, we nd that the proposed commercial risk measures are not very
successful in describing idiosyncratic risk and more work could be done in this area.
Overall, our results indicate that both empirical methodologies are valid in that our
rened country risk measure correlate well with several of the risk proxies proposed in the
literature. However, if the applied risk measure builds on the variance of GDP growth,
it is important to adjust for structural and systematic risk components in order to cap-
ture idiosyncratic country risk. Likewise, if one chooses to include various risk measures
particular attention should be directed towards the host countrys ability to service its
debt, to ensure a positive current account balance, to keep government consumption on a
sustainable level, to implement democratic accountability and to avoid external conicts.
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Abstract
An important feature of the world economy is the close global and re-
gional integration due to strong trade and investment relations among coun-
tries. The high degree of integration between countries is likely to give rise
to business cycle synchronisation in which case shocks will spillover from
one country to another. This will have implications for the way investors
evaluate the return and risk of investing abroad. This paper utilises a sim-
ple mean-variance optimisation framework where global and regional factors
capture the interdependence between countries. The model implies that FDI
is driven by the risk-adjusted rate of return as well as global and regional
spillovers. The preditions of the model are conrmed in a sample of 60
countries over the period 1970-2000.
Keywords: Foreign direct investment, risk, portfolio, business cycles
JEL classications: F21, G11, R11, E32
1 Introduction
While a large part of the empirical literature on FDI has focussed mainly on the
traditional low-return explanation of limited FDI inows to certain developing
I am grateful for the valulable comments by Carl-Johan Dalgaard and Heino Bohn Nielsen.
yDepartment of Economics, University of Copenhagen. Studiestræde 6, 1455 Copenhagen K,
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countries, more recent studies have attempted to control for the risk of investing
abroad. The importance of risk stems from the fact that, in the face of the uncer-
tainty connected to foreign investments, the objective of investors is to maximise
the expected return on their investment in which case the variance of returns
becomes a critical element in the locational choice of foreign investors. While
empirical FDI analyses remain focused on deriving proxies for local return and
risk, an important feature of the world economy is the close global and regional
integration due to strong trade and investment relations among countries. The
high degree of integration between countries is likely to give rise to business cycle
synchronisation in which case shocks will spillover from one country to another.
This will have implications for the way foreign investors evaluate return and risk.
This paper o¤ers a theoretical framework for FDI that takes both return and
risk into account, and where global and regional factors capture the interdepen-
dence between countries. This framework allows us to decompose total risk into co-
variance risk and idiosyncratic risk. Covariance risk is dened in Cochrane (2001,
Ch. 7) as the variance in a countrys return that is caused by common global and
regional factors.1 The global factor captures movements in the underlying forces
that drive the economies, i.e. oil price shocks, productivity shocks and interest
rate shocks. On the other hand, shocks that a¤ect adjacent countries owing to
similarities in production, export and trade structures would be captured by the
regional factor. Idiosyncratic risk, on the other hand, is (unsystematic) country-
specic risk and captures, among other things, changes in macroeconomic policy,
internal conicts or structural changes a¤ecting return in a particular country.
Our theoretical model predicts that FDI ows are driven by the risk-adjusted
rate of return. Moreover, once we take the interdependence between countries into
account, care should be taken in dening both return and risk. First, return should
include the spillovers from the global and regional investment climate due to busi-
ness cycle synchronisation. Second, country risk should be adjusted for covariance
risk in order to get a more precise measure of idiosyncratic risk since ignoring such
1Systematic risk and undiversiable risk have both been used in the literature as synonyms for
covariance risk. However, these terms rely on the existence of costless diversication opportunities
and on the existence of a large market portfolio. The denition of covariance risk applied in this
paper does not, and it continues to be relevant even when the investor invests only in a few
countries and where there are certain entrance costs.
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systematic comovements in returns exaggerates the measure of country risk.
We test the implications of our theoretical model on the net ow of FDI into
a cross-section of 60 developing countries. We nd that the strong relationship
between FDI inows and the risk adjusted rate of return can only be observed
in the empirical model when a precise measure of idiosyncratic risk is obtained;
that is once we control for both global and regional covariance risk. We also nd
that there is a relatively large and positive net e¤ect from global integration. On
the regional level, there is a positive net e¤ect of being located in Asia and (to a
lesser extent) in Africa. In Latin America, on the other hand, the regional return
component is exactly balanced by the risk premium required to compensate for
regional covariance risk, and there is thus no net e¤ect of being located in this
region. The results are robust to correcting for possible endogeneity problems.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarises the theoretical argu-
ments for global and regional business cycle synchronisation. Section 3 solves the
investors optimisation problem using a mean-variance optimisation framework un-
der three di¤erent scenarios of interdependence between alternative FDI locations:
no correlation (the traditional view), the presence of a global factor in a countrys
return (global business cycle) and, lastly, the coexistence of a global and regional
component in returns (global and regional business cycles). Section 4 sets out
the econometric modelling of the FDI relation and tests the implications of the
theoretical model based on the risk measures derived in Sunesen (2006). Finally,
Section 5 summarises and concludes.
2 Global and Regional Business Cycles
The phenomenon of globalisation, the close economic and nancial integration of
the world economy, is likely to give rise to comovements in economic aggregates
and thus to business cycle e¤ects. The leading explanation for business-cycle
synchronisation is trade, which captures the ow of technological transmission
and the extent to which a country is exposed to global shocks.2
2Another frequently referenced explanation is nancial integration but in light of the poorly
developed nancial markets in most developing countries we focus on the trade mechanism. We
refer to Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004) for further references on the many potential explanations
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However, as pointed out by Frankel and Rose (1998) and Heathcote and Perri
(2002), among others, one could also expect increased trade to result in increased
sectoral specialisation (through returns to scale, etc.). If the primary business cycle
shocks are sector-specic, then countries with greater similarity in sectoral struc-
tures and exports would tend to have more correlated business cycles, other things
equal. This means that if adjacent countries have more similar industrial struc-
tures, export good compositions or initial endowments (human capital, physical
capital, arable land, etc.) one might expect regional business cycle comovement.
Figure 1-3 in the Appendix suggest that there are regional similarities in the
distribution of wealth (important to the income-generating process), in the compo-
sition of natural capital (suggestive of initial endowments) and in the distribution
of economic activity (related to industrial structures) that might give rise to re-
gional business cycle synchronisation due to asymmetric shocks to world prices -
uctuations in the prices of primary, capital and intermediate goods - and in the
world real interest rate.3
Figure 1 shows the regional distribution of wealth divided into natural capital,
produced capital and intangible capital. Wealth in African countries stems mainly
from natural capital whereas intangible capital adds up to more than half of total
wealth in Latin America and Asia. Figure 2 shows the composition of natural
capital wealth. The non-renewable subsoil resources are particularly important in
Latin America but weigh less heavily in Africa and Asia. Forested areas account
for a large share of natural capital in Africa while dependency on land is strongest
in Asia. Finally, Figure 3 depicts the distribution of economic activity. While more
than a quarter of the income generated in Africa and Asia stems from agriculture,
hunting, forestry and shing, the number is only 15% in Latin America. Finally,
while the three regions have comparable levels of economic activity in the mining,
construction and transport sectors, the African manufacturing sector is largely
underdeveloped compared with Latin America and Asia.
Together the data presented here suggest that we should expect both global
and regional business cycle synchronisation. This is supported by a vast amount of
of business cycle comovement.
3Interest rate disturbances might cause signicant business cycle uctuations in highly in-
debted countries, the so-called HIPC countries, most of which are located in Sub-Saharan Africa
and Latin America.
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empirical evidence a few of which are summarised here. Kose, Otrok and White-
man (2003) nd that there is a distinct global business cycle that accounts for a
large fraction of business-cycle variability in developed countries, whereas regional
and idiosyncratic factors are more important in developing economies. The nding
of a global business cycle is supported by Albuquerque, Loayza and Servén (2002),
while Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004) and IMF (2005, Chapter 2) nd evidence of
regional business cycle comovement.
3 A Theoretical Model of Risk and Return
The presence of common global and regional factors in local returns means that
there will be some systematic pattern in the covariance of returns that the investor
can exploit in order to get a more precise measure of return and risk. The theo-
retical model builds on the mean-variance portfolio model associated particularly
with Tobin (1958, 1965) and Markowitz (1952). The model assumes that multi-
national enterprises (MNEs) estimate the expected protability of choices among
risky assets by looking at the mean and variance provided by combinations of those
assets.4
3.1 The Optimisation Problem
We make two simplifying assumptions that make the portfolio model suitable for
the investment decision of MNEs. First, direct investors typically have a relatively
long investment horizon, where the entry decision comes rst and where the in-
vestor adjusts the size of his investment according to the expected protability
of investment in the particular country. Empirically, this means that FDI inows
in some periods might become negative, which will happen if dividend payments
from the host country to the source country are higher than the investments made
in that year. In nancial terms this means that we allow for "short sales". This
assumption also ensures that all countries are in the portfolio; some will be held
4This only leads to expected utility maximisation if investors utility function depends only
on the means and the variance of wealth (quadratic utility function) and if returns are normally
distributed.
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long (receive positive amounts of net FDI) and others will be held short (receive
negative amounts of net FDI).
Second, we assume that there is riskless lending and borrowing. The majority of
foreign investors are large-scale MNEs that come from industrialised countries with
highly developed capital markets. Relative to investing in developing countries
where the risk of investment is so much higher, assuming that the home market
o¤ers riskless lending and borrowing at the world interest rate is probably not a
bad approximation.
Under the assumption of risk-less lending and borrowing, Sharpe (1963) nds
that the optimal portfolio is the portfolio with the greatest ratio of excess re-
turn (expected return minus the risk-free rate) to standard deviation that satises
that the sum of the proportions invested in the country equals 1. Substituting
the constraint into the objective function means that we can solve the investors
optimisation problem by maximising the Sharpe Ratio (SR)
max
x
SR =
NX
i=1
xi( Ri  Rf )
[
NX
i=1
x2i
2
i +
NX
i=1
NX
j=1;j 6=i
xixjij]
1
2
, (1)
where xi is the share of FDI going to country i, Ri is the expected rate of return to
investment in country i, Rf is the riskless rate of return (the world interest rate),
2i is the variance of return to investment in country i, and ij is the covariance
between returns in country i and country j. Setting the derivative with respect to
xm equal to zero and rearranging yields
dSR
dxm
=  [xm2m +
NX
j=1;j 6=m
xjmj)] + ( Ri  Rf ) = 0, (2)
where
55
 =
NX
i=1
xi( Ri  Rf )
NX
i=1
x2i
2
i +
NX
i=1
NX
j=i
xixjij
=
Rp  Rf
2(Rp)
, (3)
and Rp is the expected return on the portfolio and 2(Rp) is the variance of Rp.
Dening Zm = xm and substituting it for xm yields a system of N simultaneous
equations for N unknown variables (Zm):
Ri  Rf = Zm2m +
NX
j=1;j 6=m
Zjmj; m = 1; :::; N . (4)
3.2 Adjusting for Global and Regional Interdependence
In an optimisation model of N countries the analyst must provide estimates of N
expected returns, N variances of returns and N(N 1)=2 covariances of return. To
simplify the problem, we utilise the empirical observation of global and regional
interdependence summarised in the previous section to formulate index models
that will provide a structural solution of the model.5 We show here the derivations
for the multi-index model since the single-index model follows directly. To our
knowledge this paper is the rst to o¤er an explicit solution of a multi-index model.
In constructing the global and regional indices we make the identifying assumption
that countries are small relative to the world (regional) economy, which implies
that local factors may have a global (regional) component but that the reverse is
not true.
The multi-index model assumes that country returns move together partly
because of economy wide changes and partly because of countries belonging to
regional subgroups. Let ! be an index of global market performance dened
as ! = ! + "! where ! is the global rate of return and "! captures global
shocks. By symmetry, let  k be the index of regional market performance dened
as  k = k+"k , where k is the regional return and "k captures regional shocks
5Index models have frequently been used to simplify the nature of interdependence between
countries; see among others Rajan and Friedman (1997), Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003),
and Albuquerque, Loayza and Servén (2002).
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in region k, k 2 K where K is the set of regions. We can now dene the rate of
return to investment in country i as
Ri = i + i!! +
KX
k=1
ikIik k + ui, (5)
where i is the country-specic rate of return, and i! is the degree of global
integration, ik is the degree of regional integration, and I{k is an indicator of
regional belonging that takes the value one if country i belongs to region k and
zero otherwise. ui captures idiosyncratic (country-specic) shocks.
While a multi-index model of this kind can be employed directly, the model
would have some very convenient mathematical properties if the indexes were or-
thogonal, E(! !)( k k) = E["!"k ] = 0, and if the residual was uncorrelated
with two indexes, E[ui(! !)] = E[ui"!] = 0 and E[ui( k k)] = E[ui"k ] = 0.6
Under these assumptions total risk can be expressed as
2i = 
2
i!
2
! +
KX
k=1
2ikIik
2
k
+ 2ui, (6)
where 2! is the variance of global return, and 
2
k
is the variance of return in
region k. This formulation ensures that total risk can be decomposed into global
and regional covariance risk, 2i!
2
! and 
2
ik
2k , as well as idiosyncratic risk, 
2
ui
.
Substituting for 2i = 
2
i!
2
! +
PK
k=1 
2
ik
Iik
2
k
+ 2ui and ij = i!j!
2
! +PK
k=1 ikjkIikIjk
2
k
in (4) and solving for xi yields
xi =
1
2ui
[( Ri  Rf )  i!C!  
KX
k=1
ikIikC

k
], (7)
where C! = 
2
!
PN
j=1 Zjj! and C

k
=
PN
j=1 Zjjk
2
k
.7
6In the Cohen and Pogue (1967) notation, this means that we apply the multi-index model
in its diagonal form.
7 is the risk-adjusted excess return on the portfolio. Since it is the same for all the countries
in the portfolio, it will be ignored in the remaining part of the paper.
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3.3 Implications
Scenario 1. If there is no correlation between countries (i! = ik = 0; 8 k 2 K),
the share of FDI going to country i, xi, will be given by
xi =
1
2"i
[ Ri  Rf ].
The term Ri Rf reects the excess return over the risk-free rate of return, and
it can therefore be interpreted as the risk premium imposed on country i. Since
our empirical analysis will be based on a cross-section of countries we can set the
risk-free rate equal to zero without loss of generality. We can then simplify the
expression
xi =
1
2"i
Ri =
i
2"i
, (8)
where i is the expected rate of return to investment in country i, and 2"i is the
total risk of investing in country i (2"i = 
2
i ). In e¤ect, this implies that all FDI
should ow to the country with the highest risk-adjusted rate of return. This
approach is clearly too simplistic and such a corner solution never manifests itself.
Scenario 2. In the presence of a common movement in returns due to a global
business cycle (ik = 0 8; k 2 K), the single index model gives
xi =
1
2ei
[ Ri  Rf   i!C!].
For a country to be held long, xi > 0, we must require that C! < ( Ri Rf )=i!.
( Ri   Rf )=i! is the standardised global risk premium; i.e. the risk premium
relative to country is contribution to global covariance risk (also called excess
return to beta). We can therefore interpret C! as the global cut-o¤ point: only
countries with a standardised global risk premium beyond the global cutt-o¤point
will receive positive amounts of FDI. Again, we can rewrite the expression to get
a more intuitive interpretation:
xi =
i
2ei
+ (!   C!)
i!
2ei
, (9)
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where ! is the global return, 2ei is the risk of investing in country i adjusted for
global covariance risk (2ei = 
2
i  2i!2!), and i! is the degree of global spillovers.
The rst term is the risk-adjusted rate of return familiar from Scenario 1. The
second term reects the country-specic net e¤ect of global integration, which will
depend on the combined sign of (!   C!) and i!. If the global return is higher
than the global cut-o¤ point, ! > C!, there is a net benet of global integration
and the country therefore gains from being positively correlated with the global
business cycle, i! > 0.
Since the portfolio includes both countries that are positively and negatively
correlated with the world economy the investor gains from diversifying across coun-
tries. However, since countries are not perfectly correlated and since there is a
nite number of developing countries (each MNE is typically only present in a
small number of countries) investors cannot diversify away all covariance risk.
Scenario 3. In the presence of both global and regional business cycle e¤ects,
the relevant regression is
xi =
i
2ui
+ (!   C!)
i!
2ui
+
KX
k=1
(k   Ck)Iik
ik
2ui
, (10)
where ik is the degree of regional spillovers, C

k
is the regional risk premium,
and 2ui is total risk adjusted for both global and regional risk components (
2
ui
=
2i   2i!2!  
PK
k=1 
2
ik
Iik
2
k
). By symmetry, if the regional return outweighs the
regional covariance risk (ik   Ck > 0), a country that is positively correlated
with the regional business cycle will benet from its regional location.
The investor now experiences a second diversication gain by investing in coun-
tries that are positively as well as negatively correlated with the regional economy.
Since the regional return components are assumed to be uncorrelated once we
control for the common comovement due to the global business cycle, there is no
additional diversication benet from diversifying across regions.
4 Empirical Estimation
In this section we take the structural model of FDI to the data. To estimate the
model we need proxies for local returns, global and regional spill-overs as well as
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various risk measures. In the most elaborated case where countries are a¤ected
both by global and regional spillovers, equation (5) decomposes return according
to
Rit = it + i!!t +
KX
k=1
ikIik kt + uit.
Since direct measures of the return to FDI in developing countries are not
available, we follow the methodology in Sunesen (2006) to obtain the country-
specic return (it), the global and regional rates of return (!t and  kt), and the
degrees of global and regional integration (i! and ik). The main steps of the
procedure are shortly schetched here.
First, we proxy return by growth in GDP per capita, git, and apply annual
data for a sample of 126 developed and developing countries to estimate
git = x
0
it + "it, "it  IID(0; 2"i) (11)
where xit is a vector of slowly-moving growth determinants and "it is the growth
residual. The country-specic return, i, can then be proxied by averaging x0it^
over time, and 2"i is interpreted as conditional risk (total risk adjusted for economic
fundamentals). To take out the global return component we decompose further
"^it = i!!t + eit, eit  IID(0; 2ei) (12)
where !^t can be identied as the rst principal component from a principal com-
ponents analysis (PCA) of "^it, and i! is the factor loading. 
2
ei
is conditional risk
adjusted for global covariance risk. Averaging !t over time gives the global return
component, !. By symmetry, we adjust for regional spillovers by undertaking a
PCA of e^it for each region individually and estimate
e^it =
KX
k=1
ikIik kt + uit, uit  IID(0; 2ui) (13)
where  kt is the rst principal component and ik is the factor loading from the
PCA of region k.
The great advantage of undertaking the PCA in two steps is the precise in-
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terpretation and identication of the principal components as capturing global
and regional spillovers. In addition, the methodology ensures that the crucial as-
sumptions of the multi-index model are satised: the covariance between the two
indexes is zero, the residual is uncorrelated with each index, and the covariance
between the residual i and the two indexes is zero.
4.1 Results
We now turn to the regression analysis and we estimate the three cross-section
equations using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) for the sample of 60 countries8
Scenario 1: xi = c0
^i
^2"i
+ "i
Scenario 2: xi = c0
^i
^2ei
+ c1
^i!
^2ei
+ ei
Scenario 3: xi = c0
^i
^2ui
+ c1
^i!
^2ui
+ c2AFR
^iAFR
^2ui
+ c3ASIA
^iASIA
^2ui
+ c4LAC
^iLAC
^2ui
+ ui
While c0 reects the importance of the risk-adjusted rate of return (where the
denition of risk varies between the three scenarios), c1 reects the net benet
of global integration (!   C!), and c2 to c4 reect the net benet of regional
belonging (k   Ck , where k = AFR; ASIA; LAC). Results using standard
errors adjusted for cluster-correlations are reported in Table 1.
The rst column shows the regression results based on the traditional view
that FDI inows are driven by returns, i, and that countries are completely in-
dependent. Country returns enter positively but insignicant and the explanatory
power is very low. In Scenario 1, countries are completely independent and the
8As in the majority of empirical FDI studies, China has been excluded from the sample due
to its dominant share of FDI into developing countries and Asia in particular. Not only has
this status been achieved in a relatively short period of time, see UNCTAD (1994), but concerns
have also been raised about the reported magnitude of FDI inows into China. The World Bank
(1996) reports that the overestimation may be more than 25% of annual FDI ows. In addition,
Brazil and Mexico are huge FDI recipients compared with other Latin American countries, and
their outlier status is conrmed by the test for multiple outliers in multivariate data in Hadi
(1992, 1994).
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Table 1: FDI Regressions (OLS estimation)
Traditional Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Return 2.89 0.027 0.027 0.020**
[13] [0.03] [0.02] [0.008]
Global integration 0.11** 0.098**
[0.05] [0.04]
Asian integration 0.057***
[0.007]
Latin American integration -0.024
[0.02]
African integration 0.020*
[0.01]
Constant 0.60*** 0.57*** 0.42*** 0.34***
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1]
R-squared 0 0.07 0.18 0.51
Note: OLS regression including 60 countries (excluding China, Brazil and Mexico). The dependent variable is average net FDI inflows
from 1970-2000. Heteroscedastic consistent standard errors adjusted for cluster-correlations are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
only determinant of FDI is the risk-adjusted rate of return. This variable turns
out to be positive and insignicant and the explanatory power remains very low.
In Scenario 2 we adjust for global interdependence and we nd that there is a
positive net benet of global integration
In Scenario 3 we see that the more precise denition of idiosyncratic risk once
we adjust for global and regional covariance risk means that the risk-adjusted rate
of return is clearly identied and signicant. In addition to a positive net benet of
global integration, we nd that there is a strong positive net gain of being located
in Asia whereas the African spillover e¤ect is lower and less signicant. The Latin
American return factor, on the other hand, is exactly matched by the risk premium
required to compensate for regional covariance risk.
4.2 Endogeneity Problems
The methodology in Sunesen (2006) is based on the premise that GDP growth is
closely related to the return to investment and thus that growth is a main driver
of FDI. However, one needs to face the question of causality since FDI has the
potential to transfer knowledge and technology that might spur growth. If this
is the case, all variables in the regression are potentially endogenous since they
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are based either on predicted growth or on the growth residual. Although Hansen
and Rand (2004) present empirical evidence of a bidirectional relationship between
FDI and growth in the short run only and support for a causal link from growth
to FDI in the long run, we wish to make sure that our results are robust against
possible endogeneity problems.
We therefore use the two-stage least square (2SLS) estimator based on a set
of instruments that we expect to be highly correlated with the explanatory vari-
ables but uncorrelated with the error term. The set of instruments include: the
Fearon (2003) ethnic fractionalisation index, the land area in square kilometers
from the World Development Indicator (2005), the 1966 malaria index from Gallup
and Sachs (1999), the Alesina et al. (2003) linguistic fractionalisation index, the
dummy for landlockness from Gallup and Sachs (1999), the Barro and Lee (1994)
war dummy and the proportion of a countrys land area within 100 km of the
ocean from Gallup and Sachs (1999). Data availability means that we end up with
a sample of 56 developing countries. Results are reported in Table 2.
The Sargan Hansen test of weak instruments indicates that our instruments are
valid, and the Anderson canonical correlation test and the Cragg Donald F-test
conrm that we have no problem with weak instruments. The Anderson-Rubin
test shows that explanatory variables are jointly signicant in the regressions.
However, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test conrms the Hansen and Rand (2004)
nding that growth drives FDI and not the opposite. Hence, we can treat all
variables as exogenous in the regression and rely on the results in Table 1.
5 Summary and Conclusions
This paper applies a simplied version of the mean-variance portfolio model that
explicitly takes the interdependence of alternative investment locations into ac-
count. The model predicts that FDI inows are driven by the risk-adjusted rate of
return but that one should be very careful in the applied denition of both return
and risk. First, return should include the spillovers from the global and regional
investment climate due to business cycle synchronisation. Second, country risk
should be adjusted for covariance risk in order to get a more precise measure of
idiosyncratic risk since ignoring such systematic comovements in returns exagger-
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Table 2: FDI Regressions (2SLS estimation)
 Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3
Return 0.041 0.046**  0.019**
[0.03] [0.02] [0.01]
Global integration 0.24***  0.19***
[0.08] [0.07]
Asian integration  0.050***
[0.02]
Latin American integration  -0.065*
[0.04]
African integration 0.023
[0.04]
Constant  0.58*** 0.28**  0.33**
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1]
Number of countries 56 56 56
R-squared 0.04 0.05  0.45
Test statistics (p-values)
Sargan test of  overidentification 0.12 0.083 0.35
Anderson test of weak instruments  0.0000  0.0000 0.0017
Cragg Donald test of underidentification  0.0000  0.0000 0.0006
Anderson-Rubin test of joint significance  0.0000  0.0000  0.000
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity 1.00 0.62  0.59
Return 48.61 42.38  25.38
Global integration 37.23  55.35
Asian integration  10.69
Latin American integration  18.59
African integration  29.88
Joint significance 12.91 12.25
Note: 2SLS regression where all variables are instrumented by ethnic fractionalisation, land area, the malaria index,
linguistic fractionalisation, landlockness, war dummy and the proportion of land close to the ocean. The dependent
variable is average net FDI inflows from 1970-2000. Heteroscedastic consistent standard errors adjusted for cluster-
correlations are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
First stage F-statistics
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ates the measure of country risk. In the most extended model, we nd that the
investor diversies his portfolio in two ways: by investing in countries that are
positively as well as negatively correlated with the global business cycle, and by
investing in countries that are positively as well as negatively correlated with the
regional economy.
We test the implications of our theoretical model on the net ow of FDI into
60 developing countries. We nd that FDI inows are determined by the risk-
adjusted rate of return once we adjust for global and regional covariance risk, and
that there is a positive net benet of global integration. Also, we nd that there
is a strong positive net gain of being located in Asia whereas the African spillover
e¤ect is lower and less signicant. The Latin American return factor, on the other
hand, is exactly matched by the risk premium required to compensate for regional
covariance risk.
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Appendix
Figure 1. Distribution of Wealth
Africa Latin America         Asia
Natural capital (%)
Produced capital (%)
Intangible capital (%)
Source: World Bank (2005). Data is in per cent of total wealth. Natural capital is the sum of non-renewable subsoil resources, forested areas and land
areas. Produced capital is the sum of equipment and machinery, structures and urban land. Intangible capital is calculated as the residual wealth and
includes mainly human capital, institutional quality and social capital.
Figure 2. Composition of Natural Capital Wealth
Africa Latin America          Asia
Subsoil assets
Timber resources
Non-timber forest
resources
Protected areas
Crop land
Pasture land
Source: World Bank (2005). Data is in per cent of total wealth. Subsoil assets include oil, natural gas, coal and mineral resources.
Figure 3. Distribution of Economic Activity
Africa Latin America Asia
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and
fishing
Mining, quarrying and utilities
Manufacturing
Construction
Wholesale, retail trade,
restaurants and hotels
Transport, storage and
communication
Other Activities
Source: Data is from the National Accounts Main Aggregates Database. Data is in per cent of natural capital wealth.
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Chapter 4
Does Aid Increase Foreign Direct Investment?
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Does Foreign Aid Increase Foreign Direct
Investment?
Pablo Selayayand Eva Rytter Sunesenz
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
Abstract
The notion that foreign aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) are comple-
mentary sources of capital is conventional among governments and international
cooperation agencies. This paper argues that the notion is incomplete. Within the
framework of an open economy Solow model we show that the theoretical relation-
ship between foreign aid and FDI is indeterminate. Aid may raise the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital by nancing complementary inputs, such as public infrastructure
projects and human capital investment. However, aid may also crowd out produc-
tive private investments if it comes in the shape of physical capital transfers. We
therefore turn to an empirical analysis of the relationship between FDI and disag-
gregated aid ows. Our results strongly support the hypotheses that aid invested in
complementary inputs draws in foreign capital while aid invested in physical capi-
tal crowds out FDI. The combined e¤ect of these two types of aid is small but on
average positive.
Keywords: Foreign aid, foreign direct investment, open economy Solow model
JEL classications: F21, F35, H40, O19
1 Introduction
A salient point in the UN (2002) Monterrey Report of the International Conference on Fi-
nancing for Development is that o¢ cial development assistance (ODA), trade and foreign
direct investment (FDI) are three essential tools for development nancing. In particular:
We are grateful for comments from Carl-Johan Dalgaard, Heino Bohn Nielsen, Finn Tarp, Thomas
Rønde, Thomas Barnebeck Andersen, Jeanet Bentzen and Nina Blöndal, as well as from participants at
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"ODA plays an essential role as a complement to other sources of nancing
for development, especially in those countries with the least capacity to at-
tract private direct investment. A central challenge, therefore, is to create the
necessary domestic and international conditions to facilitate direct investment
ows, conducive to achieving national development priorities, to developing
countries, particularly Africa, least developed countries, small island develop-
ing States, and landlocked developing countries, and also to countries with
economies in transition." (UN, 2002, p. 9).
However, the implicit presumption that ODA has a "catalysing" e¤ect on FDI, i.e.,
that aid and FDI are complements, is by no means evident. Kosack and Tobin (2006) argue
that aid and FDI are unrelated, because aid is mainly oriented to support the government
budget and nance investments in human capital, while FDI is a private sector decision
and relatively more connected to physical capital. Caselli and Feyrer (2007) nd that
the marginal product of capital (MPK) is roughly the same across countries, and one of
the implications is that increasing aid inows to developing countries will lower the MPK
in these economies and will tend to be fully o¤set by outows of other types of capital
investments (p. 540). If this is the case, aid and FDI are clearly closer to being substitutes
rather than being complements.
This paper provides a unied framework for assessing the relative merit of these dif-
ferent claims. We set up an open-economy Solow model with perfect capital mobility
that distinguishes between aid directed towards complementary factors of production and
aid invested in physical capital. The distinction serves to illustrate, on the one hand,
that aid invested in complementary factors increases MPK in the recipient country, which
tends to draw in additional foreign resources, and thus helps to sustain a higher level of
capital over time. For example, aid can ease important bottlenecks in poor countries by
nancing public infrastructure and human capital investments that would not have been
undertaken by private actors (due to the free-riding problem in nancing public goods),
nor by public agents (because of the budgetary constraints that prevent aid-recipient gov-
ernments from undertaking this type of investments). On the other hand, the model also
shows that foreign aid invested in physical capital directly competes with other types of
capital, and thus replaces investments that private actors would have undertaken anyway.
In this case, capital mobility and rate-of-return equalisation across countries will give rise
to a ight of other types of capital after an aid ow has been received.
The theoretical model provides a number of results and testable predictions. First, for
a given level of domestic saving, aid invested in physical capital crowds out other types of
foreign investments in physical capital, one for one. Second, aid invested in complementary
factors of production has an ambiguous e¤ect on FDI. The logic of the ambiguity is that,
while an increase in complementary factors increases MPK, the productivity increase also
raises income, domestic savings and domestic investments, which tends to lower MPK
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and thus to crowd out foreign investments. These two ndings suggest that the overall
impact of aid on FDI is ambiguous and that the composition of aid matters. Finally, the
relationship between complementary aid and FDI is unlikely to be linear, so scale e¤ects
from this type of aid should be taken into account.
We take the implications of our theoretical model to the data utilising a panel of 84
countries over the period 1970-2001. We nd a large and positive e¤ect of aid invested
in complementary factors, while aid invested in physical capital has a negative impact on
FDI. Although the combined impact of these two types of aid on FDI remains positive, our
results imply that more aid should be directed towards inputs complementary to physical
capital to optimise the return on aid. The results are robust to (1) a broader denition
of complementary aid than that adopted in our benchmark estimations, (2) to allowing
for imperfect capital mobility, and (3) to including other traditional FDI determinants.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the scarce empirical literature
on FDI and aid. Section 3 introduces the theoretical model of FDI and aid building on
an open economy Solow model with perfect capital mobility. Section 4 discusses relevant
econometric issues and presents the data. Section 5 shows the results, and Section 6 tests
their robustness. Section 7 sums up and discusses policy implications.
2 Literature Review
The relationship between aid and FDI is controversial and empirical results remain incon-
clusive. To our knowledge, only four papers explicitly analyse the relationship between
aid and FDI. Harms and Lutz (2006) and Karakaplan et al. (2005) analyse the question
for a broad sample of developing countries. Karakaplan et al. (2005) nd that aid has a
negative direct e¤ect on FDI and that both good governance and nancial market devel-
opment signicantly improve the impact of aid on subsequent ows of FDI. Harms and
Lutz (2006), on the other hand, nd that once they control for the regulatory burden in
the host country, aid works as a complement to FDI and, surprisingly, that the catalysing
e¤ect of foreign aid is stronger in countries that are characterised by an unfavourable
institutional environment.
The two case studies based on Japanese FDI and aid ows in Kimura and Todo (2007)
and Blaise (2005) also nd incongruent results. While Blaise (2005) nds positive e¤ects
of aid to infrastructure projects, Kimura and Todo (2007) nd no positive infrastructure
e¤ect, no negative rent-seeking e¤ect but a positive vanguard e¤ect (arising when foreign
aid from a particular donor country promotes FDI from the same country but not from
other countries).
This paper argues that the mixed results can be explained by the high level of ag-
gregation of the aid variable. While Karakaplan et al. (2005) include only overall ODA,
Harms and Lutz (2006) also distinguish between grants, technical cooperation grants, as
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well as bilateral and multilateral aid. However, it remains unclear why one would expect
foreign investors to react di¤erently to these sources of aid. Kimura and Todo (2007)
apply the idea of di¤erent types of aid, but construct their proxies relying only on data
for aid commitments and they only separate out aid to physical infrastructure.
3 A Theoretical Model of FDI and Aid
A general shortcoming in the empirical literature is the lack of consensus on the speci-
cation of the FDI relation, and none of the existing empirical papers on aid and FDI are
supported by a theoretical model. This paper closes this gap by proposing a Solow model
for a small open economy to model the main characteristics of the relationship between
aid and FDI.1
We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function where GDP per capita, y, is given by
y = Ak, (1)
where k is the stock of physical capital per capita, K
L
,  is a constant and A denotes total
factor productivity.
We assume that the total ow of foreign aid, AID, can be split into aid invested in
complementary factors, AIDA, and aid invested in physical capital, AIDK , where AID =
AIDA+AIDK . AIDA by nature raises the marginal productivity of all production factors
that are complementary to physical capital.2 For example, infrastructure investments lead
to the interconnection of markets (Easterly and Levine, 1999), while investments in human
capital improve technology adoption. AIDK , on the other hand, enters the production
function only through its e¤ect on physical capital accumulation, and has no (augmenting)
e¤ect on total factor productivity.3
To model this explicitly, we rst assume that complementary aid has an augmenting
e¤ect on all production factors that are complementary to physical capital, and we thus
allow the ow of AIDA to increase the existing stock (A0) of A in the economy:
A = A0 + AIDA. (2)
Allowing complementary aid to have a direct impact on A is a shorthand for the idea that
AIDA has an augmenting e¤ect on any production factor other than k (e.g. human capital,
1One exception is Beladi and Oladi (2007) who analyse the question in a general equilibrium setting
where all foreign aid is used to nance public goods.
2The argument of complementarity between public and private investment is generalised by Clar-
ida (1993) and Chatterjee et al. (2003). Reinikka and Svensson (2002) nd empirical support for the
importance of complementary public capital for foreign investors.
3We thus allow part of foreign aid to be productivity enhancing while FDI brings no spillovers. In
reality, all capital transfers might contain some knowledge transfer but the assumption is made to keep
the model simple and tractable.
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public investments, new technology, etc.) and, thus, it is able to increase ultimately
the MPK.
Second, we assume an open economy.4 Accordingly, in per capita terms, capital equip-
ment can be nanced by (i) domestic savings (S = sy, where s is a given savings rate),
(ii) foreign direct investments (fdi) and (iii) the inow of aid invested in physical capital
(aidK). Then capital accumulation per capita is given by
_k = sy + fdi+ aidK   (n+ )k, (3)
where n is the population growth rate and  is a xed depreciation rate.
With perfect capital mobility, the world real rate of return, rw, pins down at any point
in time the net return to capital (MPK   ), and thus
rw = MPK   = Ak 1   . (4)
According to (4), the steady state level of k at any point in time is given by
k =

A
r
 1
1 
, (5)
where r is dened as a gross world real rate of return, rw + .
Rewriting (3) taking (5) as given, the ow of FDI per capita is determined as the
residual
fdi =  aidK   sy + (n+ )k, (6)
where y = Ak.
At a rst glance, (6) seems to support the Caselli and Feyrer (2007) conjecture that
aid and FDI are substitutes: for a given level of domestic savings, equalisation between
MPK and r requires an increase in foreign aid to be accommodated by a proportional
reduction in FDI:
@fdi
@aidK
=  1. (7)
However, this nding only holds for aid invested in physical capital. The e¤ect of
complementary aid, on the other hand, has two components:
@fdi
@aidA
=  s @y

@aidA
+ (n+ )
@k
@aidA
. (8)
First, since
s
@y
@aidA
= s
@ (Ak)
@aidA
= s

Lk + Ak 1
@k
@aidA

> 0, (9)
4In line with Sørensen and Witta-Jacobsen (2006, Ch. 4) and Turnovsky (2000).
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complementary aid has a positive e¤ect on domestic savings and thus on domestically
nanced capital investments. This result comes from the fact that aidA shifts the pro-
duction function thereby raising the steady state levels of income and domestic savings.
Given the assumption of MPK equalisation in (4), the corresponding increase in domesti-
cally nanced investments causes a proportional reduction in the need for FDI of the size
 s @y
@aidA
.
Also, since
@k
@aidA
=
@
@aidA
 
A
r
 1
1 
!
=
1
1  

A
r
 
1  L
r
> 0, (10)
we see that complementary aid has a positive e¤ect on the steady state capital stock.
This nding is based on the augmenting e¤ect of aidA, which raises MPK and thus allows
the recipient country to increase its capital stock without experiencing a counterbalancing
capital ight. That is, for a xed s, aid-nanced investments in complementary factors
allow a sustainable increase in FDI equal to (n+ ) @k

@aidA
.
This model holds then several implications that should be taken into account when
assessing the empirical relationship between aid and FDI. First, the e¤ect of total aid on
FDI is ambiguous:
@fdi
@aid
=
@fdi
@aidK
+
@fdi
@aidA
=  1  s @y

@aidA
+ (n+ )
@k
@aidA
? 0, (11)
because we expect aid to production sectors to have a negative e¤ect on FDI, but the
e¤ect of complementary aid is indeterminate. Second, from equations (9) and (10), since
the marginal e¤ect of complementary aid on FDI includes the level of aid itself, the
relationship between complementary aid and FDI is not linear. In particular, there are
scale e¤ects from complementary aid that should be taken into account. Since  s @y
@aidA
and (n+ ) @k

@aidA
work in opposite directions, the sign of the second order e¤ects will also
be indeterminate and will need to be assessed empirically. Third, the model stresses the
need to take all sources of capital into account, and it is therefore essential to include
domestic savings as an additional explanatory variable in the empirical FDI analysis. To
our knowledge, this has not been done before.
4 Econometric Issues
In a panel setting, the econometric interpretation of the aid-FDI relationship is
fdiit = 0 + 1A
0
it + 2nit + 3Sit + 4aid
K
it + 5aid
A
it + 6
 
aidAit
2
+ uit, (12)
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where fdiit is FDI per capita in country i during period t, A0it is the overall productivity
level at the beginning of period t, nit is population growth, Sit is domestic savings per
capita, aidKit is aid invested in physical capital, and aid
A
it is aid invested in complemen-
tary factors. The square of aidAit is included in (12) to control for the scale e¤ects of
complementary aid.
We expect 1 to be positive since a high productivity level gives a high steady state
level of capital, 2 should be positive since a fast growing population lowers the per capita
capital stock and thus allows for an increase in FDI per capita, and 3 should be negative
since high domestic saving lowers the need for foreign capital. From equation (7) we know
that aidK crowds out foreign investments one-to-one, 4 =  1, whereas the e¤ect of aidA
(5 and 6) is indeterminate. Since data on total productivity is unavailable, the next
section will discuss the strategy used to identify A0it empirically.
4.1 Productivity
Since data on the initial productivity level (A0it) is unavailable, we need to nd valid
proxies. In the rst case, we use pooled OLS (POLS) and estimate
fdiit = t + 0 + 1nit + 2Sit + 3aid
K
it + 4aid
A
it + 5
 
aidAit
2
+ uit, (13)
where t is a time-specic constant that captures common productivity shocks at time t.
However, not all countries start out with the same initial conditions and we thus allow also
for cross sectional di¤erences in productivity by including time-invariant country-specic
xed e¤ects, i,
fdiit = t + i + 0 + 1nit + 2Sit + 3aid
K
it + 4aid
A
it + 5
 
aidAit
2
+ uit. (14)
This equation can be estimated consistently and e¢ ciently with a xed e¤ects model
(FE). However, if productivity evolves unequally across countries over time, regression
(14) leaves out important information. We therefore extend the list of variables to include
a lagged dependent variable, which captures time-moving country-specic factors as well
as agglomeration e¤ects,
fdiit = t+i+0+1fdiit 1+2nit+3Sit+4aid
K
it +5aid
A
it+6
 
aidAit
2
+uit. (15)
Equation (15) can be estimated consistently and e¢ ciently using the Arellano and
Bond (1991) Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. It is important to
notice that including a lagged dependent variable also reduces the need to control for
other FDI determinants. All estimators use standard errors that are robust to arbitrary
heteroskedasticity as well as intra-group correlation (clustering).
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4.2 Endogeneity
We need to consider the possible endogeneity of aid in estimating the above equations,
since all estimators are consistent only if all explanatory variables are exogenous. Aid
would be endogenous, for example, if donors systematically disburse more resources to
those countries that are neglected by private foreign investors (Harms and Lutz, 2006).
We therefore estimate (13)(15) following the instrumentation strategy in Hansen and
Tarp (2000, 2001), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) and Dalgaard et al. (2004).
The rst set of instruments accounts for donorsoverall preference for granting more
aid to countries with smaller populations and lower levels of income per capita and thus
includes (lagged) interactions between levels of aid and (i) the size of population and (ii)
the initial level of GDP per capita in the recipient country. We also include the lagged
level of aid to account for persistency in other determinants of aid as well as a dummy
variable for African countries in the CFA franc zone to capture particular donorsstrategic
interests.
Tests conrm the validity of our instruments, and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test nds
that the aid variables should be treated as endogenous in the FDI relation. All the results
reported in the next section are therefore based on Instrumental Variables (IV) methods.
4.3 Data
The dependent variable, fdiit, is net FDI inows in constant US dollars from the UNCTAD
Foreign Direct Investment database, divided by the population to control for country size.
The main explanatory variables are the population growth rate and savings per capita
from the WDI (2005).
The aid variables are based on total net ows of o¢ cial aid disbursements reported in
the OECD/DAC database. Since data on sectoral disbursements are available only after
1990, the measure of per capita aid ows to sector s, aidsit, is constructed using sectoral
commitments as a proxy for sectoral disbursements. In particular, we follow Clemens
et al. (2004) and Thiele et al. (2006) and assume that the proportion of aid actually
disbursed to sector s is equal to the proportion of aid committed to sector s, and hence
that
aidsit 
commitsitP
s commit
s
it
P
s aid
s
it, (16)
where commitsit is the amount of ODA commitments to sector s. Approximating sectoral
disbursements with sectoral commitments may cause some concerns due to di¤erences in
denitions and statistical record (see Clemens et al., 2004, for more details). However,
according to Odedokun (2003) and Clemens et al. (2004) this problem is likely to be
small since disbursements and commitments (both on the aggregate and sectoral levels)
are highly correlated. Also, annual discrepancies are likely to be larger than averages,
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and we thus average the data over ve-year intervals.
Aid is decomposed into two broad categories according to its purpose of investment:
 Aid invested in complementary inputs: aid oriented to social infrastructure (such
as education, health, and water supply projects) and economic infrastructure (such
as energy, transportation and communications projects).
 Aid invested in physical capital: contributions to directly productive sectors (such
as agriculture, manufacturing, trade, banking and tourism projects).
These two aid categories capture the main characteristics of aidA and aidK : aid in-
vested in complementary factors is intended to generate positive spillover e¤ects (public
goods, inputs complementary to physical capital) whereas aid invested in physical capi-
tal has a more narrow purpose and could more easily have been undertaken by private
investors. Other sectoral aid categories (like multisector support, programme assistance,
debt reorganisation, emergency assistance and unallocated types of aid) are excluded
from the analysis since they are primarily oriented to provide scal budget support in the
recipient country.5
5 Results
Figure 1 in Appendix shows the partial correlation between FDI and aid invested in
physical capital. While there seems to be a negative relationship between the two vari-
ables, it is di¢ cult to assess if there is full crowding out from the downwards sloping line
(that is, to assess if the slope is  1). Figure 2 in Appendix depicts the partial correla-
tion between FDI and aid invested in complementary goods. The gure clearly indicates
that the two variables are positively correlated and that the relationship might not be
linear. However, the exact predictions from the theoretical model can only be tested
in a more comprehensive framework where country-specic characteristics capture the
cross-sectional heteroskedasticity clearly prevalent in the gures.
Results from estimating equations (13)(15) for a sample of 84 countries using ve-
year intervals are reported in Table 1. Independently of the chosen estimator, our results
strongly support the notion that aid invested in complementary factors has a catalysing
e¤ect on FDI. This means that the short-run replacement e¤ect of aidA on FDI is out-
weighed by the positive e¤ect that complementary aid has on the long-run levels of income
and capital per capita. A Hausman test conrms the signicance of xed e¤ects, and the
highly signicant lagged dependent variable suggests that we should rely on the consistent
5Section 6 includes a test for robusteness of the results with respect to the denition of complementary
aid, and a note about the changes in the results when variables possibly correlated with aidA are included
in the regressions.
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Table 1: FDI and Foreign Aid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
POLS FE GMM-DIF GMM-SYS GMM-SYS
aidK  0:59  1:56  0:77  0:94  0:88
[0:8] [0:3] [0:2] [0:2] [0:2]
aidA 1:67
 1:71 1:34 1:24 1:07
[0:5] [0:2] [0:2] [0:2] [0:2]
aidA, squared  0:0028  0:0012  0:0015  0:0015  0:0013
[0:0006] [0:0007] [0:0002] [0:0002] [0:0002]
Savings, sy 29:7  32:3 1:11 20:5  20:2
[16] [24] [23] [7:8] [17]
Pop. growth, n  7:26  0:97 1:05  3:7  2:19
[3:5] [1:4] [1:6] [2:5] [1:8]
fdit 1 0:045 0:40 0:38
[0:1] [0:09] [0:1]
GDP per capita 13:7
[4:1]
Constant 12:9 : : 5:04 1:14
[14] : : [8:5] [6:0]
Observations 289 277 217 289 289
R2 0:11 0:08 : : :
N. countries 84 72 76 84 84
Model specication tests:
Hansen-Sargan overid. (0:21) (0:88) (0:15) (0:34) (0:79)
Underid. (0:0028) (0:0) : : :
Cragg-Donald F (0:0021) (0:0) : : :
Anderson F joint sig F (0:0) (0:0) : : :
DWH p (0:071) (0:0026) : : :
AR(1) : : (0:00) (0:21) (0:75)
AR(2) : : (0:77) : :
Hypothesis tests on marginal e¤ects evaluated at the median:
ME of aidK =  1 0:41  0:56 0:23 0:06 0:12
[0:83] [0:30] [0:19] [0:25] [0:21]
ME of aid > 0 0:96 0:10 0:50 0:24 0:13
[0:52] [0:37] [0:13] [0:09] [0:07]
ME of aidA > 0 1:55 1:66 1:27 1:18 1:02
[0:51] [0:18] [0:16] [0:22] [0:22]
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets, p-values
in parentheses. The dependent variable is FDI per capita. All regressions include time
dummies. Aid variables are instrumented with own lags, interactions with GDP per
capita, log(pop) and a FRZ dummy.
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and e¢ cient Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator in our further analysis. When
the time series are persistent, the rst-di¤erence GMM (GMM-DIF) estimator is poorly
behaved since under such conditions lagged levels of the variables are only weak instru-
ments for subsequent rst-di¤erences. We therefore rely on the system GMM (GMM-SYS)
estimator suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). All
variables are treated as endogenous, which means that instruments should be lagged two
periods or more to be valid.
The results in column (4) in Table 1 show that, for a given domestic savings rate, one
aid dollar invested in complementary factors draws in 1.24 dollars of FDI, both in per
capita terms. The square of complementary aid is negative and signicant, suggesting
that the "savings" e¤ect described in equation (9) dominates for su¢ ciently high levels of
aidA. Evaluated at the median of the sample, our results indicate that the marginal e¤ect
of aidA on fdi is 1.18, and a Wald test conrms it to be signicantly positive. Having
specied a dynamic model, we can calculate the long run e¤ect of aidA by assuming a
that the level of FDI per capita is the same in every period. Evaluating at the median,
we nd that one additional aid dollar per capita invested in complementary factors draws
in 1.97 (1.18/0.6) dollars of FDI per capita in the long run. We conclude from this that
aidA generates important short run as well as long run benets for foreign investors.
The results also conrm the crowding out e¤ect of aid invested in physical capital, since
one aid dollar per capita invested in physical capital replaces 0.94 dollars of fdi, which
accumulate to 1.57 dollars in the long run (0.94/0.6).
The e¤ect of population growth is insignicant throughout the analysis. But, con-
trary to the prediction from our model, we nd a positive rather than a negative e¤ect of
domestic savings on fdi. A plausible explanation is that foreign investors look explicitly
at data on national savings when making their investment decisions and interpret a high
s as a signal of sustained growth history and good economic prospects.6 To adjust for
this positive externality we include GDP per capita in column (5). Adjusting for the pur-
chasing power of the population leaves savings insignicant and negative, which suggest
that once we correct for the positive signalling e¤ect of a high saving rate, domestic and
foreign capital are substitutes as suggested by the theoretical model.
Finally, we perform some tests of hypothesis and present the results at the bottom of
the Table. We test the Caselli and Feyrer (2007) conjecture that aid invested in physical
capital replaces FDI one for one. The Wald tests show that we cannot reject its validity in
most of the cases. We also nd that the combined e¤ect of aidA and aidK is signicantly
positive and between 0.21 and 0.24 (evaluated at the median of the sample), which implies
that the substitution e¤ect of aidK is more than outweighed by the positive e¤ects of aidA
6This is in line with evidence showing that the households with the highest lifetime incomes are the
ones with highest lifetime saving rates (Carroll, 2000), and that higher growth rates lead to higher savings
rates (Carroll, Overland and Weil, 2000; Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén, 2000).
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on fdi in a typical country. If the marginal e¤ects are evaluated at the mean instead of
the median, our conclusions remain the same.
6 Robustness
In light of the important policy implications arising from our results, it is necessary
to ensure that these results are robust to correcting for possible misspecications in the
empirical relationship between FDI and aid. We carry out three basic checks for robustness
of our empirical ndings.
6.1 Technical Assistance
The grouping of aid variables could be questioned. In particular, aid in this paper does not
include Technical Cooperation Grants (TCGs), which contribute to development primarily
through education and training. Since TCGs consist of activities involving the supply
of human resources or actions targeted on human resources (education, training, and
advice) one could easily argue that TCGs would have the same impact as aid invested in
complementary factors. In the Appendix (Table 4) we therefore replicate the specications
from Table 1 using an extended denition of aidA that includes also TCGs from the OECD
database. Although there is a slight drop in the size of the coe¢ cients, the results from
Table 1 carry over.
6.2 Imperfect Capital Mobility
If mobility of capital is imperfect, MPK should be allowed to deviate from the gross world
interest rate by a risk-premium, , that reects idiosyncratic country characteristics. In
this case, the rst-order condition in (4) should read
r +  = MPK, (17)
and the capital stock in (5) should be redened accordingly:
k =

A
r + 
 1
1 
. (18)
While this renders the e¤ect of aid invested in physical capital unchanged, the e¤ect
of complementary aid becomes somewhat more complicated. The risk premium impact
FDI directly through (18) but, given that
@k
@aidA
=
@
@aidA
 
A
r + 
 1
1 
!
=
1
1  

A
r + 
 
1  L
r + 
, (19)
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the marginal e¤ect of aidA will also depend on the risk premium and thus on country-
specic characteristics. To capture this econometrically, we include the risk premium level
and its interaction with aidA, and estimate
fdiit = t + i + 0 + 1nit + 2Sit + 3aid
K
it + 4aid
A
it + 5
 
aidAit
2
(20)
+6it + 7
 
aidAit  it

+ uit.
6 and 7 are expected to be negative because higher risk reduces country is attrac-
tiveness as an investment location.
To capture the risk premium we include the overall International Country Risk Guide
rating as well as its three subcategories of risk: political, nancial and economic.7 All
risk variables are treated as endogenous. In general, lower political risk is associated with
higher levels of overall accountability, stability and institutional quality in the political
process. In particular, from the ICRG rankings, political risk is lower (1) the higher
the government stability, (2) the better the socioeconomic conditions and the investment
prole, (3) the lower the number of internal conicts, external conicts and political
corruption, (4) the lower the military is involved in politics, (5) the lower the religious
and the ethnic tensions, (6) the higher the prevalence of law and order, and (7) the
larger the degrees of democratic accountability and bureaucratic quality. Results from
estimating (20) including these political risk measures are reported in Table 2.8
The political risk variable enters only signicantly in four cases. Relative absence of
external conict, low level of religious tensions and a high level of democratic account-
ability suggest all a lower risk premium and tend to attract foreign investors. However,
the prevalence of law and order shows a negative impact on FDI inows (signicant only
at the 10% level, though). This counter intuitive result might be due to the fact that
we have already accounted for domestic savings, which will be highly correlated with this
risk variable: countries characterised by high prevalence of law and order tend to have
higher domestic saving.
The interactions between complementary aid and the political risk indicator are more
often signicant, and the results suggest that government stability, favourable socioeco-
nomic conditions, an attractive investment prole, low military interference in politics
and better bureaucratic quality are all supportive of a high steady-state level of capital.
Although the results show a negative impact of the interaction between aidA and the
index for low degree of religious tensions, the net marginal e¤ect on FDI remains positive.
Table 3 presents similar estimations taking into account di¤erent economic and nan-
7In order to detect signicant e¤ects of aid on FDI, Karakaplan et al. (2005) and Harms and Lutz
(2006) use aid interacted with the Kaufmann et al. (2005) governance indicators to capture di¤erences
in government e¤ectiveness.
8For the results in Table 2, a high value of the di¤erent political-risk measures is associated with a low
overall political risk, and hence, a high value of the di¤erent risk measures should have a positive e¤ect
on fdi.
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cial risk measures. The economic risk variables reect the macroeconomic situation and
the economic advancement of the host country: GDP per capita, real GDP growth, ina-
tion, the budget balance as a share of GDP and the current account as a share of GDP.
The nancial risk variables assess a countrys ability to nance its o¢ cial, commercial
and trade debt obligations: external debt as a share of GDP, debt service as a share of
exports, the current account as a share of export, international liquidity as months of
import cover and exchange rate stability (calculated here as the annual change in the
real exchange rate).9 Results in Table 3 keep our overall conclusions unchanged. It is
interesting to note, however, that the political risk variables seem to be more important
to foreign investors than the economic and nancial risk variables.
6.3 Omitted Variables
Tables 2 and 3 show a positive impact from the savings rate on fdi. We adjust for this
in Tables 5 and 6 including the level of GDP per capita in the regressions. As in Table 1,
the e¤ect of savings disappears and it is captured by the level of GDP per capita, which
supports our results previously suggesting the existence of positive externalities from s to
fdi.
However, it is important to notice that once we adjust for the risk of investing abroad
by including various proxies for the risk premium, population growth turns out to have
a signicantly negative impact on fdi in both Tables 2 and 3. One explanation might
be that a fast growing population is attractive for the e¢ ciency-seeking investor but that
the quality of the abundant labour in some countries might be too poor to attract foreign
investors. In this case, a fast growing population might instead cause social tensions and
excessive burdens on the public system, which will tend to scare away foreign investors
rather than draw in more investments.10 We therefore add the primary school enrolment
rate from the World Development Indicators (2005) in Tables 5 and 6, to take the quality
of the labour force and the level of development into account.11 In many cases, the
adjustment for the quality of the labour force means that population growth no longer
enters signicant and in the remaining cases it reduces the size of the initially negative
e¤ect on fdi. It is interesting noticing that the adjustment for the level of human capital
reduces the size of the e¤ect of aidA on fdi. This means that the aidA variable is picking
up the information that we intend, and thus substantiates our choice and denition of
di¤erent types of aid.
9Similar to the case of the political risk indexes, all these di¤erent measures reect lower overall levels
of economic and nancial risk.
10This is in line with Mankiw, Romer and Weils (1992) point that a higher population growth rate
implies lower per capita human capital levels and thus lower MPK levels. This will have a negative
impact on FDI.
11The data on school enrolment is highly unbalanced, so we interpolated within countries to ll in
gaps, and extended the series with the rst and the last values to complete the extremes. The correlation
between the original and the transformed series is above 0.98 in both cases.
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Finally, while our empirical specication includes both variables predicted by our
theoretical model as well as a rich specication of idiosyncratic country characteristics,
there might be additional variables that play a role in the allocation choice of foreign
investors. To test for this, further regressions included measures of market potential
(regional dummies, urban population and rural population), factor market characteristics
(size of the labour force, average years of schooling) and market access (openness, number
of vehicles, transportation network density, telephone lines and rail lines). None of them
turned out signicant or to have a qualitative impact on our results. These results are
available upon request.
7 Conclusion
Due to its potential to transfer knowledge and technology, create jobs, boost overall
productivity, and enhance competitiveness and entrepreneurship, attracting FDI to de-
veloping countries is essential to contribute to economic growth, development and poverty
reduction. Given the emphasis on using ODA as a vehicle for creating a private sector
enabling environment, the question of whether or not aid ows induce signicantly more
FDI inows becomes an important and relevant question not only on its own right but
also as an essential element in the aid e¤ectiveness debate.
The results strongly support the hypotheses that aid invested in inputs complementary
to physical capital draws in foreign capital, while aid directly invested in physical capital
crowds out private foreign investments. While the impact of the two types of aid together
is positive, an important policy implication is that the composition of foreign aid matters
and that more aid should be directed towards complementary inputs. Such investments
improve the absorption capacity of the recipient country and increase MPK in the host
country, which allows it to accumulate more foreign capital without experiencing a drop
in domestic investments or a ight of foreign capital.
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Figure 1: FDI and Aid to Physical Capital (aidK)
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Figure 2: FDI and Aid to Complementary Factors (aidA)
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Table 4: FDI and Foreign Aid  Alternative Denition of aidA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
POLS FE GMM-DIF GMM-SYS GMM-SYS
aidK  0:29  1:47  0:71  0:75  0:74
[0:8] [0:2] [0:2] [0:3] [0:2]
aid yA 1:09
 1:65 1:33 0:97 0:87
[0:4] [0:2] [0:2] [0:2] [0:2]
aid yA, squared  0:0020  0:0012  0:0015  0:0012  0:0011
[0:0004] [0:0006] [0:0002] [0:0002] [0:0002]
Savings, sy 38:5  25:8 6:62 26:5  20:3
[17] [22] [20] [10] [18]
Pop. growth, n  8:91  1:7 0:52  5:50  3:18
[4:1] [1:4] [1:4] [3:2] [2:3]
fdit 1 0:018 0:37 0:36
[0:1] [0:1] [0:1]
GDP per capita 15:4
[4:3]
Constant 18:8 : : 5:73  0:99
[13] : : [10] [6:7]
Observations 289 277 217 289 289
R2 0:11 0:08 : : :
N. countries 84 72 76 84 84
Model specication tests:
Hansen-Sargan overid. (0:12) (0:53) (0:11) (0:30) (0:86)
Underid. (0:0017) (0:0) : : :
Cragg-Donald F (0:0013) (0:0) : : :
Anderson F joint sig F (0:0) (0:0) : : :
DWH p (0:17) (0:0018) : : :
AR(1) : : (0:00) (0:12) (0:54)
AR(2) : : (0:69) : :
Hypothesis tests on marginal e¤ects evaluated at the median:
ME of aidK =  1 0:71  0:47 0:29 0:25 0:26
[0:80] [0:24] [0:19] [0:28] [0:22]
ME of aid > 0 0:71 0:13 0:56 0:17 0:07
[0:57] [0:33] [0:15] [0:11] [0:08]
ME of aid yA > 0 1:00
 1:60 1:26 0:92 0:82
[0:35] [0:14] [0:16] [0:23] [0:21]
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in
parentheses. The dependent variable is FDI per capita. All regressions include time
dummies. Aid variables are instrumented with own lags, interactions with GDP per capita,
log(pop) and a FRZ dummy. aid yA is dened as aidA+ technical cooperation grants.
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Table 7: Partial Correlations  Main Variables
fdi aidK aidA aid
y
A n sy
fdi 1
aidK  0:24 1
aidA  0:16 0:79 1
aid yA  0:15 0:78 0:99 1
n  0:24 0:03  0:05  0:02 1
sy 0:35 0:12 0:19 0:17  0:18 1
Table 8: Partial Correlations  Economic Risk Measures
GDP per GDP Ination Budget Curr. Acc.
capita growth rate balance balance
GDP per capita 1
GDP growth  0:08 1
Ination rate 0:14  0:23 1
Budget balance 0:12 0:18  0:20 1
Curr. Acc. balance 0:22 0:19  0:24 0:25 1
Table 9: Partial Correlations  Financial Risk Measures
Foreign For. debt Curr. Acc. Reserves to Exch. R.
debt service to exports imp. months stab.
Foreign debt 1
For. debt service 0:14 1
Curr. Acc. to exports  0:56  0:17 1
Reserves to imp. months  0:24  0:05 0:22 1
Exch. R. stab. 0:30 0:28  0:26  0:01 1
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Table 11: Summary Statistics
Obs Median Mean Std. dev. Min. Max
Main variables:
fdi 289 9:8 27:2 64:1  384:9 547:0
aidK 289 6:8 15:9 41:9  18:7 442:1
aidA 289 21:6 40:1 79:6  12:2 914:4
aid yA 287 32:5 50:3 82:2  7:0 926:0
n 289 2:3 2:2 1:0  5:1 7:0
sy 289 0:1 0:3 0:5  0:4 3:2
Political risk measures:
ICRG index 233 60:3 60:1 10:3 27:6 80:6
Govt. stab. 232 8:0 7:6 2:2 2:3 12:0
Socio-ec. condit. 232 5:0 4:9 1:5 1 9
Investm. prole 232 6:1 6:3 1:8 1:2 11
Internal conict 232 8:2 7:8 2:4 0:4 12:0
External conict 232 9:8 9:4 2:0 2:3 12:0
Political corrup. 232 3:0 2:8 0:9 0 5
Military in politics 232 3:0 3:1 1:5 0 6
Religious tensions 232 5:0 4:3 1:4 0 6
Law and Order 232 3:0 3:2 1:1 1 6
Ethnic tensions 232 4:0 3:9 1:4 0 6
Democ. account. 232 3:3 3:3 1:2 0 6
Bureauc. quality 232 2:0 1:7 0:9 0 3:5
Economic risk measures:
GDP per capita 289 1:1 1:5 1:7 0:1 9:1
GDP growth 289 3:7 3:7 3:1  11:5 15:7
Ination rate 280 0:1 0:2 0:3 0:0 2:8
Budget balance 242 0:0 0:0 0:0  0:4 0:2
Curr. Acc. balance 274  3:1  3:2 5:9  31:2 20:1
Financial risk measures:
Foreign debt 285 0:6 0:7 0:6 0:1 7:0
For. debt service 270 18:8 19:7 13:5 1:3 84:5
Curr. Acc. to exports 274  0:1  0:2 0:3  1:6 0:4
Reserves to imp. months 268 3:3 3:8 3:1 0:1 26:0
Exch. R. stab. 289 0:1 0:2 0:4  1:7 2:8
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